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The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates doctrinal and theoretical 
challenges for assigning tort liability. With emergent capabilities, autonomous machines 
disrupt the structure of interpersonal rights and duties in tort law, framed by conditions 
of foreseeability and proximate causation. Where algorithmic processes are unintelligible, 
self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern goes, algorithmic harms will be untraceable 
to tortious human agency. As a result, their costs will simply lie where they fall—on faultless 
victims. This outcome would be unfair and objectionable: A failure of tort’s mechanisms of 
corrective justice means faultless victims would disproportionately bear the accident costs 
of autonomous machines. 
This article suggests that the doctrinal form of vicarious liability is a promising strategy to 
ground tort liability for autonomous-machine-caused harm. Human or corporate deployers 
should be held liable for tortious harm caused by autonomous machines in the course of 
deployment. In this account, autonomous machines constitute a novel legal category as 
pure legal agents without legal personhood. In reconceiving vicarious liability—and the 
legal classification of autonomous machines—the article seeks to promote commonsensical 
liability outcomes for autonomous-machine-caused harm, consistent with tort’s doctrinal 
and theoretical structure of corrective justice. 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE are triggering 
deployment of autonomous machines, or autonomous agents (AAs), in new 
roles, projected to be signifcant parts of our social fabric in coming years 
(e.g., driving cars, performing surgeries, caregiving).1 Technological advances 
have enabled computer and algorithmic systems to learn from experience by 
analyzing large amounts of instructive data at extraordinary speed, and to interact 
with their external environments by using sensors and actuators to perform 
dynamic physical tasks.2 As a result, we expect increased interaction between 
humans and autonomous machines, presenting novel risks of accidental harm 
to individuals and property.3 Tere have already been, in this respect, harmful 
accidents involving self-driving cars and warehouse robots, resulting in legal 
1. See e.g. Meera Senthilingam, “Would You Let a Robot Perform Your Surgery By Itself?” 
(12 May 2016), online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/health/robot-surgeon-bowel-
operation/index.html>; Adam Goldenberg, “If an Autonomous Vehicle Has an Accident, 
Who is Legally Responsible?” (18 December 2018) online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/ 
opinion/if-an-autonomous-vehicle-has-an-accident-who-is-legally-responsible>; Adriana 
Barton, “Cyclons, Tey Are Not. Tese Intelligent and Friendly Robots Are Designed to 
Help the Elderly Live a Better Life” (26 August 2018) online: Globe and Mail < www. 
theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-ftness/article- cylons-they-are-not-these-intelligent-
and-friendly-robots-are>; Jacqueline Howard, “Robot Pets Ofer Real Comfort” (1 November 
2017) online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2016/10/03/health/robot-pets-loneliness/index.html>. 
2. Jerry Kaplan, Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artifcial 
Intelligence (Yale University Press, 2015) at 4-5. 
3. See e.g. Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513 at 
534 [Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”]. 
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suits for personal injury and wrongful death.4 Tese developments raise critical 
questions and uncertainty about the scope of human accountability for harms of 
autonomous machines using emergent algorithms. Where algorithmic processes 
are unintelligible, self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern is that designers 
and users will lose full operative control of their outputs and efects, thereby 
reducing accountability for resultant accidental harms.5 A growing body of tort 
scholarship, in particular, reveals signifcant concern about liability gaps: scholars 
worry that suppliers, owners, and users of autonomous machines will too easily 
escape liability because of difculties in tracing algorithmic harms to tortious 
human agency.6 As a result, victims would disproportionately bear the accident 
costs, which is, arguably, an unfair and objectionable liability outcome. 
Te possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm, then, generates 
signifcant doctrinal and theoretical challenges for assigning tort liability. 
Autonomous machines have features that disrupt the structure of interpersonal 
rights and duties in tort, which is framed by conditions of foreseeability and 
4. See e.g. Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where 
Robots Roam” (19 March 2018) online: New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/ 
technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html>; Peter Holley, “After Crash, Injured Motorcyclist 
Accuses Robot-Driven Vehicle of ‘Negligent Driving’” (25 January 2018) online: Washington 
Post <www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/01/25/after-crash-injured-
motorcyclist-accuses-robot- driven-vehicle-of-negligent-driving/?utm_term=.ca85154c515e>; 
Te Fernandez Firm, “What Happens When a Robot Causes Wrongful Death?” (30 March 
2017) online: Medium <medium.com/@thefernandezfrm/what-happens-when-a-robot-
causes-wrongful-death-3d1f4f7e9711>; Seth Baum & Trevor White, “When Robots Kill” 
(23 July 2015) online: Te Guardian <www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/ 
jul/23/when-robots-kill>. 
5. See e.g. Andreas Matthias, “Te Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the 
Actions of Learning Automata” (2004) 6 Ethics and Information Technology 175; Jack M 
Balkin, “Te Tree Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data” (2017) 78 Ohio St LJ 1217 
at 1233-34; Frank Pasquale, “Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, 
Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society” (2017) 78 Ohio St LJ 1243 at 
1247-55; Madeleine Clare Elish, “Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot 
Interaction” (2019) 5 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 40; Alexander Campolo 
& Kate Crawford, “Enchanted Determinism: Power Without Responsibility in Artifcial 
Intelligence” (2020) 6 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 1. 
6. See e.g. Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3; David C Vladeck, 
“Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artifcial Intelligence” (2014) 89 Wash 
L Rev 117; Peter M Asaro, “Te Liability Problem for Autonomous Artifcial Agents” 
(Association for the Advancement of Artifcial Intelligence 2016 Spring Symposium Series 
delivered at the Stanford University, 22 March 2016), (AAAI Press, 2016); Curtis EA 
Karnow, “Te Application of Traditional Tort Teory to Embodied Machine Intelligence” 
in Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2016) 51 at 74; Jack Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 51-55. 


















proximate causation.7 As a general matter, AAs can sense phenomena, process 
what they sense, and act upon the world.8 AAs are embodied and emergent:9 
As embodied entities, AAs take some corporeal form, are designed to act in 
the world, and can directly impact individuals and property.10 As emergent 
entities, their behaviours are not entirely pre-programmed. AAs can update 
their algorithms through machine learning techniques to efectively adapt 
to new circumstances.11 With emergent capabilities, AAs operate with some 
degree of functional independence; they are empowered to self-select methods 
to achieve programmed goals.12 Tere are, moreover, two dimensions to AAs’ 
independence. First, AAs’ machine learning capabilities and engagement 
with novel circumstances negate full control and foreseeability on the part of 
human designers and users.13 Second, through machine learning processes, 
AAs’ controlling algorithms are designed by their learning algorithms.14 In this 
latter afrmative sense, AAs modify their behaviours through internally caused 
processes—a kind of functional agency.15 AAs are still, no doubt, deterministic 
systems: their outputs are defned by inputs received.16 AAs’ ultimate goals are 
also not their own, but programmed by human designers to advance human 
interests. Nevertheless, due to AAs’ emergence, it is exceedingly difcult to 
fully trace connections between environmental inputs and changes in their 
7. See Pinchas Huberman, “Tort Law, Corrective Justice and the Problem of 
Autonomous-Machine-Caused Harm” (2021) 34:1 Can JL & Jur 1 105 at 109-113 (for a 
lengthier discussion of AAs’ salient features threatening to disrupt tort law). 
8. See Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 529. Tis is neatly phrased as 
the “sense-think-act paradigm.” 
9. Ibid at 532. 
10. Ibid at 534. 
11. Ibid at 538-39. See also Shannon Vallor & George A Bekey, “Artifcial Intelligence and the 
Ethics of Self-Learning Robots” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot 
Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2017) 
338 at 340; Harry Surden, “Machine Learning and Law” (2014) 89 Wash L Rev 87 at 89-95; 
Deven R Desai and Joshua A Kroll, “Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law” 
(2017) 31 Harv JL & Tech 1 at 26-29; Matthias, supra note 5 at 179. 
12. See Karnow, supra note 6 at 56-60. 
13. Matthias, supra note 5 at 182. 
14. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 11 at 28. 
15. See Ugo Pagallo, Te Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts and Torts (Dordrecht: Springer Science 
+ Business Media, 2013) 38; Wolf Loh & Janina Loh, “Autonomy and Responsibility in 
Hybrid Systems” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From 
Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2017) 39. 
16. See Neil M Richards & William D Smart, “How Should the Law Tink About Robots” 
in Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016) 3 at 18. 
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algorithms and behaviours.17 In this sense, AAs are “unpredictable by design.”18 
With combined capacities of emergence and embodiment, AAs’ characteristic 
unpredictability is coupled with the potential to cause personal injury and 
property damage. Even well-trained AAs can produce undesirable outputs in the 
real world, including accidental harm.19 While such harm refects misalignment 
between AAs’ codes and programmers’ goals, this misalignment may not be 
introduced by, or knowable to, programmers themselves.20 
Consequently, AAs’ harmful efects may be principally untraceable to 
tortious actions of designers, manufacturers, or users.21 If so, under traditional 
tort doctrine, the cost of harm resulting from AAs’ emergent behaviours will 
simply lie where it falls.22 Under the law of negligence—tort law’s paradigmatic 
doctrine in the context of accidents causing personal injury or property 
damage—tort liability follows only if the plaintif’s loss is caused by, and within 
the scope of, a defendant’s tortious act involving foreseeable and unreasonable 
risk to the plaintif.23 If AAs’ emergent processes, outputs, and harmful efects 
are typically unforeseeable, it will be difcult to identify tortious conduct by 
their designers, manufacturers, or users.24 Moreover, if AAs’ harmful efects stem 
from machine-learning algorithms, impacted by variable environmental inputs, 
it will be difcult to attribute any particular instance of AA-caused harm to 
responsible human conduct as its proximate cause.25 Te harm may be more 
precisely attributable to some environmental input, rather than a tortious aspect 
of the AA’s design, construction, or operation, if any. Finally, AA-caused harm 
is not analogous to common law strict liability categories, such as keeping wild 
animals, using explosives, or transporting gasoline. Deploying AAs should 
not be viewed as exceedingly dangerous. In some instances, AAs are projected 
to be less risky than the human actors they replace. For instance, automated 
vehicles will likely be safer than conventional vehicles due to the absence of 
17. Matthias, supra note 5 at 182. 
18. Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 542. 
19. See Vallor & Bekey, supra note 11 at 343. 
20. Ibid. 
21. See Vladeck, supra note 6 at 121-23. 
22. See Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3, 542; Asaro, supra note 6, 191; 
Karnow, supra note 6, 63-74; F Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, 
Regulation and Innovation” (2014) 66 Fla L Rev 1803 at 1851-52. 
23. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (Te Wagon 
Mound), [1961] AC 388. 
24. See Karnow, supra note 6 at 74; Pagallo, supra note 15 at 117. See also Karnow, supra note 6 
at 63-64, 72-73. 
25. See Asaro, supra note 6 at 191-92. 
















human-driver-error.26 If deploying AAs is expected to reduce risks associated 
with human activities, it should not be characterized as an abnormally dangerous 
activity.27 It is dissimilar to keeping wild animals or using explosives, which are 
inherently tortious, involving characteristic risk that exceeds the levels normally 
assumed in ordinary patterns of interaction.28 
Tis doctrinal outcome refects tort law’s theoretical structure of corrective 
justice, which does not straightforwardly apply to AA-mediated social 
interaction.29 As a practice of corrective justice, tort law assumes a bilateral relation 
as its subject: its doctrines determine whether there is a legally relevant link 
between a particular defendant’s tortious act and the plaintif’s loss, grounding 
the defendant’s agent-specifc duty to repair.30 In the context of personal injury 
and property damage, tort liability responds to breaches of qualifed duties of 
relational non-injury:31 where wrongful action materializes in loss to an object 
of the plaintif’s right. In this view, tort law assumes a relation between two legal 
persons situated symmetrically with correlative rights and duties, delineated by 
its doctrinal terms of fair interaction. Tort law demarcates the scope of rightful 
action with an objective standard of care, setting reciprocal constraints on 
individuals’ actions. Acts of risk imposition that exceed an objectively reasonable 
level are deemed tortious: Te law evaluates whether individuals’ external actions 
are wrongful, in this respect, without judging individuals’ inner-character, 
blameworthiness, or subjective lack-of-concern for others.32 
Tort liability operates, moreover, only upon the conjunction of wrongful 
action and causation. Absent wrongdoing, causation of harm is not a tort: If the 
act is consistent with norms of rightful action, the causation of harm does not 
26. Bryant Walker Smith, “Automated Driving and Product Liability” (2017) Mich 
St L Rev at 15. 
27. Ryan Abbott argues, in this respect, that where autonomous machines are safer than their 
human counterparts, human actors should be subject to the more exacting standard of a 
“reasonable robot,” the purpose of which is to deter the human activity and incentivize 
adoption of the preferable automated alternative. See Ryan Abbott, Te Reasonable Robot: 
Artifcial Intelligence and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020) at 66-70. 
28. For a lengthier doctrinal analysis of AA-caused harm under the laws of negligence and strict 
liability, see Huberman, supra note 7 at 122-31. 
29. For a more comprehensive presentation of this argument, see ibid at 118-22. 
30. See Ernest J Weinrib, Te Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 168-70 
[Weinrib, Private Law]. 
31. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts” 
in Gerald J Postema, ed, Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge University Press, 
2001) 214 at 218-20. 
32. See OW Holmes, Te Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) at 108. 
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infringe upon the plaintif’s right.33 Likewise, absent causation, a wrongful act is 
not a tort as, in this instance, there is no interference with an object of a plaintif’s 
right at all.34 Te locus of tort liability is wrongful loss, not just any loss sufered 
by innocent victims, nor any unreasonable activity undertaken by tortious 
actors. Tort liability is, then, concerned with a version of outcome-responsibility: 
Liability results from the normative attribution of a plaintif’s loss to a wrongful 
action as its legally responsible cause. As a matter of corrective justice, tort law 
implicates responsible human agency, grounding agent-specifc liabilities and 
duties to rectify harmful efects of wrongful action.35 
AA-caused harm does not ft neatly within this basic structure.36 Since AAs 
are not legal subjects bearing tort duties, harm resulting from AAs’ emergent 
processes—i.e., processes which are not traceable to tortious programming, 
instruction, or manipulation by human designers or users—does not stem 
from pertinent legal agency. AA-caused harm, in this sense, seems to be legally 
comparable to natural-events-causing harm, which leaves victims without an 
avenue for compensation in tort. Tis outcome refects a traditional application 
of tort law, which evaluates whether particular instances of AA-caused harm are 
legally attributable to human tortious conduct—whether negligent use or design. 
However, this traditional analysis implicitly views AAs as ordinary products, 
and fails to adequately grasp the distinctive character of AA-mediated social 
relations. AAs are expected to perform tasks previously undertaken exclusively 
by humans—e.g., driving cars, performing surgeries, caregiving—with some 
functional independence. AAs’ social signifcance is not entirely analogous to 
ordinary products: AAs act on environmental inputs that are not traceable to 
particular human designers or users, and their outward efects are not necessarily 
attributable to human agency, as the efects of products typically are. But 
AA-caused harm is also not morally equivalent to natural-events-causing harm: 
Unlike natural disasters, AAs are purposely deployed by humans to advance 
their interests. AAs have special social and normative signifcance, as mediators 
of human interaction: Tey are deployed by individuals and corporations to 
independently perform complex tasks in interaction with other individuals and 
property. AAs’ special utility and functional independence suggest that they are 
33. Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in Private Law” (2010) 60 
UTLJ 731 at 766-70. 
34. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Harvard University Press, 2016) at 116. 
35. Jules L Coleman, “Te Practice of Corrective Justice” in David G Owen, ed, Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 53 at 66-69. 
36. For a lengthier discussion of the argument in this paragraph and the next, see Huberman, 
supra note 7 at 121-22, 135-37. 






better regarded as quasi-social-actors, extraordinary entities without self-evident 
legal classifcation. 
Construing AAs as (functional) actors reveals a critical insight: Tere is no tort 
liability for AA-caused harm under negligence or strict liability because distributors 
or users are not the relevant actors that cause the harm—AAs were deployed 
to perform the tasks instead. Tese doctrines do not capture the relevance of 
(reasonable) deployment of another actor to perform a task as grounds for liability. 
A formalistic application of tort law, then, leads to a fundamental incongruity: 
Whereas personally performing tasks causing accidental harm could potentially 
produce tort liability, individuals can avoid liability altogether by deploying AAs 
to perform the tasks instead. And, in turn, the emergent and harmful efects of 
AAs fall outside the realm of tort law as they are not legal subjects. Tis liability 
outcome, however, does not capture the normative signifcance of distributing 
or using AAs, which entails an uncontrollable potential of harm, at least in 
isolated cases. Since deployers utilize AAs’ emergent features to advance their 
purposes, they should assume some responsibility for AA-caused harm—in the 
agent-specifc sense, as a matter of tort law—despite reduced foreseeability and 
proximate causation. Tis demands creative use of tort categories and potentially 
reconceiving AAs’ legal classifcation to evaluate AAs’ proper normative impact 
on the rights and duties of legal persons. 
To this end, this article considers the doctrinal form of vicarious liability for 
AA-caused harm: whether deployers (users or distributors) of AAs may be liable 
for tortious acts committed by AAs in the course of deployment.37 It argues that 
a vicarious liability approach ofers a pragmatic doctrinal solution that rests on 
plausible theoretical foundations. In this account, AAs’ outward behaviours would 
be evaluated as tortious or non-tortious. AAs commit torts where their outward 
behaviours fail to conform to standards of care expected of reasonable persons 
in the circumstances. Vicarious liability then attaches to defendant deployers 
for tortious acts of AAs that occur in the course of deployment, circumventing 
the need to trace AA-caused harm to tortious conduct by deployers themselves 
(i.e., negligent use or legally defective design). Te solution is a pragmatic one: 
It is a way to discover a basis of liability despite AAs’ functional independence 
and characteristic unpredictability, which prevents direct attribution of AAs’ 
emergent processes, outputs, and harmful efects to human agency. It is also 
conceptually plausible and normatively sound: It refects deployers’ agent-specifc 
37. Te deployers, for the purposes of vicarious liability, may be users or distributors, as discussed 
in Part III(D), below. 
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responsibility for deploying functionally independent and instrumentally rational 
actors to perform tasks entailing the distinctive risks of AA-caused harm. 
Te move to vicarious liability for AA-caused harm is certainly controversial. 
It implies that AAs are legal actors capable of committing torts that can be 
imputed to human principals. At the core of the vicarious liability account is a 
legal stance toward AAs that is analogous to employees or legal agents: AAs act on 
behalf of human or corporate deployers, empowered to ground deployers’ liability 
for their tortious harms occurring in the course of deployment. Tis approach 
generates fresh doctrinal and theoretical complications to be addressed in this 
article: What is the method to evaluate AAs’ actions as tortious or non-tortious? 
What is the method to determine whether AAs’ tortious actions are sufciently 
connected to their deployment to impute their tortious acts to their deployers? 
How does the agency relation between AAs and their deployers arise? Can AAs 
be coherently compared to employees for purposes of tort liability, though they 
are not legal persons? 
Tis article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the doctrinal elements of 
common law vicarious liability: a tort, committed by an employee, in the course 
of employment. It focuses, specifcally, on the doctrinal role of enterprise risk, 
which forms the requisite link between employees’ torts and their employers, 
grounding vicarious liability. Part II provides a conceptual account of vicarious 
liability, consistent with its doctrinal confguration and tort law’s basic structure, 
which embodies agent-specifc reasons for liability. In this account, vicarious 
liability refects employers’ and employees’ joint production of, and joint 
responsibility for, tortious harm. Where an employee’s tortious act is linked to 
risks of enterprise, the act is also attributable to the employer: Since the employer 
enterprise is identifed with the employee’s tortious act, it is deemed an additional 
responsibility base. In this view, vicarious liability grounds agent-specifc reasons 
for liability specifcally suited to employment relations in which employers and 
employees act jointly in pursuit of collective aims of enterprise. Tis account lays 
the foundation for conceiving of AA deployment as a form of legal agency—akin 
to employment—as elaborated upon in the following section. 
Part III extends the doctrinal elements of vicarious liability to the context of 
AA-caused harm. AAs are deemed to be legal actors pursuant to a legal intentional 
stance, with capacity to commit tortious acts. AAs’ tortious acts are then 
attributable to their deployers when committed in the course of deployment— 
that is, when linked to characteristic deployment risk—which grounds deployers’ 
vicarious liability. A distinctive theoretical conception of legal agency is at 
play in the vicarious liability account: AAs are pure legal agents without legal 





personhood. AAs can therefore give efect to legal consequences for deployers, 
but not on their own account. Tis article argues that a pure legal agency 
classifcation nicely captures AAs’ social and normative position within human 
relations, as functionally independent and rational instrumentalities deployed 
to act exclusively for deployers’ purposes. Te pure legal agency classifcation 
emphasizes the legal signifcance of the deployment relation as a whole—not 
AAs’ independent legal or moral status—implicating deployers’ responsibility for 
AAs’ outputs and harmful efects. 
Tis account, moreover, is illuminated by philosophical accounts that 
perceive sophisticated technologies as extending human agency. Drawing on the 
philosophy of technology scholarship of Deborah Johnson and F. Allan Hanson, 
it argues that AAs’ tortious acts cannot be dissociated from their deployment and 
its characteristic risks. AAs’ tortious acts committed in the course of deployment 
should stand in as surrogates to evaluate deployers’ responsibility in tort. Crucially, 
this article does not endorse any specifc position about AAs’ metaphysical or 
moral status. It also does not insinuate that AAs have independent legal status: 
their normative impact on rights and duties of legal persons is intrinsically tied 
to the deployment relation as a whole—the deployment risk—implicating 
deployers’ responsibility, not their own. 
Part IV sketches the relation between pure legal agency and ordinary legal 
agency, which is constituted by two legal persons. Drawing on Lionel Smith’s 
interpretation of fduciary duties, it identifes a core idea of legal agency applicable 
to AAs: Legal agency refects a social relation whereby one actor acts exclusively 
for the interests of another. It also highlights two fundamental aspects of legal 
agency that are absent in AA deployment. Te frst is that agency relations are 
typically formed by mutual assent of agent and principal. Te second is that 
central to agency relations are fduciary duties owed by agents to their principals. 
Te article concludes by ofering a way to think about these doctrinal 
requirements in the context of AAs. It argues that mutual assent and fduciary 
duties are necessary to constitute legal agency relations specifcally where legal 
agents are also legal persons with their own subjective frst-personal interests. Since 
AAs are not legal persons, but sophisticated instrumentalities, they inherently 
occupy a social role akin to legal agents: Tey are deployed to act exclusively for 
deployers’ purposes, and lack subjective interests of their own, rendering doctrinal 
requirements of mutual assent and fduciary duties redundant. While only a 
preliminary sketch, the pure legal agency account plausibly grounds deployers’ 
vicarious liability as a matter of tort law, or so the argument goes. 
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Before continuing further, I must address, albeit briefy, the reasons for 
undertaking doctrinal analysis of AA-caused harm, and particularly, in the form 
of vicarious liability. One may reasonably object to this approach: Te perspective 
of tort doctrine is too narrow to confront challenges posed by cutting-edge 
technology. It is preferable, the objection goes, to concentrate on identifying 
legitimate policy goals—e.g., to incentivize innovation, establish consumer-safety 
product-design standards, deter cost-inefcient and unsafe product design, 
reduce or widely-spread accident costs, compensate innocent victims—and to 
craft regulatory schemes to promote them.38 I concede that this criticism is sound: 
Tese policy objectives could be implemented through regulatory schemes to 
distribute fairly the benefts and burdens of AAs, including their accident costs. 
It is also possible that specifc industries—e.g., healthcare, transportation—will 
be subject to liability schemes that compensate accident victims.39 Te advantage 
of sidestepping tort law is clear: It avoids doctrines embodying notions of 
corrective justice and outcome responsibility, which have confusing application 
in the context of deploying emergent AAs which may cause accidental harm. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to undertake common law tort analyses of 
AA-caused harm. First, tort analyses disclose legal options for policymakers 
to consider. Since legislative liability schemes may be modelled upon existing 
common law doctrines—though, perhaps, with modifcation—rigorous doctrinal 
analysis can reveal potential regulatory approaches, thereby contributing to the 
legislative process. Second, it is important to have a common law jurisprudence 
for AA-caused harm (alongside alternative liability schemes) if deployment of AAs 
becomes commonplace. Common law principles of general application will be 
necessary for cases of AA-caused harm that are not subject to specifc regulatory 
schemes, and courts will look to tort law for a doctrinal resolution to the problem 
of AA-caused harm. Tird, tort law embodies distinctive norms of interpersonal 
38. For scholarly approaches that identify these policy concerns and consider tort and other 
regulatory schemes and standards to promote them, see e.g., Mark A Geistfeld, “A Roadmap 
for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety 
Regulations” (2017) 105 Calif L Rev 1611; Hubbard, supra note 22; Kenneth S Abraham & 
Robert L Rabin, “Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New
Legal Regime for a New Era” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 127. 
39. For instance, Kenneth Abraham and Robert Rabin propose a new compensation regime, 
termed Manufacturers Enterprise Responsibility (MER), for victims of autonomous 
vehicles. MER would operate as a third-party insurance system funded by manufacturers of 
autonomous vehicles to compensate accident victims without resort to proof of negligence 
or product liability. It would be an exclusive remedy, replacing victims’ rights to sue in 
tort. See Kenneth S Abraham & Robert L Rabin, “Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer 
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 127. 







responsibility, which provide a worthy contribution to scholarly work on the 
ethics of artifcial intelligence and robotics. Tort doctrines and principles are 
normatively rich, ofering insight into questions about risk, wrongdoing, and 
causation. Tort theory, then, contributes to ethical refection about accountability 
for supplying and using emergent AAs that cause accidental harm. In addition 
to ofering concrete doctrinal solutions, tort analyses should constitute part of 
the growing philosophical and ethical literature on artifcial intelligence and 
robotics. Finally, tort analyses of AA-caused harm have self-standing value as an 
exercise in tort theory: to refect upon tort law’s applicability in the context of 
AA-mediated social relations. In contrast to the previous three reasons—relating 
to tort’s contribution to resolving social and ethical problems of AA-caused 
harm—this fourth reason underscores that AA-caused harm is problematic for 
tort law. Tort law is concerned with a kind of interpersonal injustice—linking 
a plaintif’s loss to a particular defendant’s tortious action—that may be simply 
irrelevant in the context of AA-mediated interaction. Te concern is that 
emergent AAs—functionally independent, non-legal subjects—render tort law’s 
internal normative viewpoint inapplicable. Tort analysis of AA-caused harm, 
in this respect, is important for its own sake: to study tort law, its proper scope, 
and its limits. 
But these reasons take us only so far. Te critic may still argue that this article’s 
vicarious liability or pure legal agency approach is too extreme a reconception 
of tort law. Instead, the argument would go, it is preferable to make modest 
adjustments for which there is some historical precedent, such as reducing causation 
standards or plaintifs’ burden of proof, or embracing strict products liability.40 
My contention, nonetheless, is that any modifcation to tort law must address 
the fundamental issue of fair interpersonal conduct with respect to deploying 
AAs. Reduced-fault modifcations, however, point toward alternative liability 
schemes; such fxes muddle the reasoned basis of agent-specifc liability in tort. 
Absent notions of wrongful interpersonal conduct and outcome responsibility, 
tort’s narrow focus on particular bilateral interactions between defendants and 
plaintifs is unfair, preventing losses from being shared by all similarly situated 
enterprise participants benefting from the relevant activity causing harm. 
Tese reduced-fault fxes also respond inadequately to the advent of emergent 
AAs, continuing to treat them as ordinary products. A doctrinal resolution is 
better served by thinking carefully about AAs’ salient features—including their 
40. Tese alternative modifcations of tort are addressed, for instance, in Hubbard, supra
note 22 at 1852. 
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extraordinary roles as functionally independent and rational instruments—that 
disrupt the structure of interpersonal rights and duties in tort.41 
Te pure legal agency or vicarious liability account is valuable for this 
reason: It ofers a legal conception of AAs that captures their salient features and 
guides sound tort liability outcomes. My argument is that vicarious liability is a 
suitable doctrinal form to evaluate tort liability for AA-caused harm: It provides 
agent-specifc grounds for liability specifcally appropriate to the AA-deployment 
relation. My aim, in this sense, is to fnd coherence, in refective equilibrium, 
between tort principles, the morality of corrective justice, and commonsensical 
liability outcomes for AA-caused harm. 
I. THE COMMON LAW OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Under the modern formulation of vicarious liability, employers are liable for 
torts committed by employees in the course of employment.42 In this respect, 
vicarious liability has three doctrinal elements.43 First, an employee commits a 
tort. Te foundation of vicarious liability is the employee’s tortious causation of 
harm. Liability is then broadened by imposing it on an additional defendant, the 
employer.44 For this reason, an employer who is liable under vicarious liability 
typically has a right to indemnity from the employee, the tortious actor.45 
Second, the person committing the tort is an employee of the defendant.46 
Tere is no conclusive test to determine whether a person is an employee rather 
than an independent contractor.47 Te central question is whether the person 
engaged to perform services does so as a servant for the employer, or whether the 
person acts independently “as a person in business on his own account.”48 Several 
factors assist this determination: the level of control the employer has over the 
worker’s activities; whether the worker provides his own equipment or hires his 
own helpers; the degree of fnancial risk, investment and management held by 
41. See Jack B Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 47-48. 
42. See Ernest J Weinrib, Tort Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed (Emond Publishing, 2014) at 
610 [Weinrib, Tort Law]. 
43. Ibid. 
44. William Lloyd Prosser and Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th (West 
Group, 1984) at 499. 
45. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co v Lister, [1957] AC 555 [Lister]; London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne 
& Nagel International Ltd, [1992] 3 SCR 299 [London Drugs]. 
46. See Weinrib, Tort Law, supra note 42 at 610. 
47. 671122 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc, 2001 SCC 59 at paras 46-48. 
48. Ibid at para 47. 

















the worker; and the worker’s opportunity for proft in the activity.49 Tere are 
also exceptional instances where vicarious liability extends to acts of independent 
contractors, such as where employers have non-delegable duties of care or where 
the work is especially dangerous.50 
Tird, the employee’s tort is committed in the course of employment. In the 
doctrinal language, this requirement excludes torts committed while the employee 
is “on a frolic of his own,” but includes torts committed while the defendant’s 
“deviation from the prescribed task can be construed merely as a detour.”51 Even 
unauthorized or prohibited conduct can be construed as being in the course of 
employment if it is rightly regarded as a mode—albeit an improper one—of 
carrying out authorized acts of business.52 
Te function of vicarious liability is to hold employers responsible for tortious 
acts of employees that relate to characteristic risks of enterprise.53 Te critical 
analysis is whether an employee’s tortious act is, in some sense, characteristic of 
and attributable to a risk created by the enterprise. Te doctrinal signifcance of 
enterprise risks can be seen in the seminal case Ira S Bushey.54 In that case, a drunk 
employee of the United States Cost Guard negligently turned wheels on a drydock 
wall, for no apparent reason, causing the ship to fall against, and damage, the 
drydock. Although the employee’s tortious act did not have explicit purpose to 
serve the employer, the Court held the defendant government vicariously liable 
for the employee’s negligent act. Te Court stated that vicarious liability rests 
in a “deeply rooted sentiment” that a business enterprise should be responsible 
for tortious accidents that are characteristic of its activities.55 An enterprise is 
liable for employees’ tortious acts that relate to risks inherent in the ongoing 
activities of the enterprise. Importantly, however, since vicarious liability 
attaches to general ongoing risk of enterprise, an employee’s particular tortious 
act need not be foreseeable to the employer as a real and substantial risk in the 
negligence sense. In Ira S Bushey, the Court found that the employee’s negligent 
action—though not specifcally foreseeable, nor aimed at a legitimate business 
rationale—was still part of the seafaring activity as it took place on the ship while 
attending to seafaring matters.56 Since the seafaring enterprise employed seamen 
49. Ibid. 
50. See Weinrib, Tort Law, supra note 42 at 616. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Canadian Pacifc Railway v Lockhart, [1941] SCR 278 at paras 9, 12. 
53. Ira S Bushey & Sons, Inc v United States, 398 F 2d 167 (2nd Cir 1968) [Bushey]. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid at 171. 
56. Ibid at 172. 
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who recurrently cross the drydock while drunk, potential tortious damage to the 
drydock was viewed as a risk inherent to the seafaring enterprise. By contrast, the 
Court noted, if the employee had damaged property on the street while walking 
to the ship, the incident would have related to his domestic life, not his seafaring 
activity, and liability would not extend to the enterprise itself.57 
More recently, in a series of cases dealing with vicarious liability for sexual 
assault committed by employees, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) afrmed 
the centrality of enterprise risk to vicarious liability. In Bazley v. Curry, the Court 
held that a defendant non-proft organization operating a residential care facility 
was vicariously liable for its employee’s sexual assault of children in its care.58 
Justice McLachlin, writing for the court, stated that employers are vicariously 
liable for unauthorized tortious acts of employees that fall within the ambit of 
risk that the enterprise creates or exacerbates.59 Te question of vicarious liability, 
then, concerns whether there is a sufcient nexus between the enterprise’s risk 
and the employee’s subsequent tort.60 To ground vicarious liability, the enterprise 
needs to materially enhance the risk of tortious harm by putting the employee 
in a position conducive to preforming the tortious act.61 Tis involves more than 
merely creating an opportunity for the tortious act, or being a but-for cause of 
the tortious act.62 Yet, the enterprise risk does not need to be a foreseeable and 
substantial risk of the particular kind of resulting harm in the negligence sense. 
Enterprise risk is not tortious risk; it does not ground the tortious causation of 
harm itself. Rather, the doctrinal function of enterprise risk is to link employees’ 
tortious causation of harm—whether negligence or intentional tort—to distinct 
risk inherent to the enterprise as a whole.63 Te determination of vicarious 
liability turns on judging the strength of the connection between employees’ 
tortious acts and risks of enterprise. Vicarious liability captures instances where 
risks of enterprise could be seen to produce employees’ tortious acts. In Justice 
McLachlin’s words, “it must be possible to say that the employer signifcantly
increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position 
and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks.”64 Te employment of the 
57. Ibid. 
58. Bazley v Curry, [1999] 2 SCR 534 [Bazley]. 
59. Ibid at para 37. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid at para 40. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid at para 39. 
64. Ibid at para 42 [emphasis in original]. 














tortious actor must signifcantly increase the risk of the kind of tortious harm 
that ultimately ensues. 
In Bazley, the defendant care facility was vicariously liable for the sexual 
assault committed by its employee, as it materially increased the risk of sexual 
assault. Te defendant care facility provided its employee with opportunity for 
intimate private control—a parental relationship—over children in its care. Te 
incidents of abuse were the “product of the special relationship of intimacy and 
respect the employer fostered, as well as the special opportunities for exploitation 
of that relationship it furnished.”65 By contrast, in Jacobi v. Grifths, a companion 
case to Bazley, the SCC held that a defendant non-proft club providing group 
recreational activities for children was not vicariously liable for sexual assault 
committed by its program director.66 In Jacobi, the opportunity that the club 
provided the program director for abuse was slight, as its activities were public, 
occurring in groups, and in the presence of volunteers.67 Te sexual abuse was 
possible only because the program director “subverted the public nature of 
the activities,” enticing children to his home.68 According to the Court, the 
director’s tortious acts were insufciently related to risks of enterprise, which 
merely provided the director opportunity to work with children in public and 
non-intimate settings. Likewise, several years later, in E.B. v. Order of the Oblates, 
the SCC held that a defendant residential school was not vicariously liable for 
sexual assault committed by its maintenance employee.69 Te Court found that 
the employee’s duties did not include authority to be in situations of intimacy 
with students, nor to be alone with them.70 While the residential school increased 
students’ vulnerability in a general sense, there was no specifc or enhanced risk 
due to employing the particular tort-committing-employee in his particular 
position to perform his assigned tasks.71 
Accordingly, the critical point of analysis is whether an employee’s tortious 
act can be traced to a distinct risk in employing the tortious actor. Vicarious 
liability refects a particular kind of relation between the enterprise and the 
ensuing tortious act: Te tortious act relates to a characteristic risk of enterprise 
in employing the tortious actor in a particular position to perform assigned 
65. Ibid at para 58. 
66. Jacobi v Grifths, [1999] 2 SCR 570. 
67. Ibid at para 80. 
68. Ibid. 
69. EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in the Province of British 
Columbia, 2005 SCC 60. 
70. Ibid at para 48. 
71. Ibid. 
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tasks. If this relation is present, unauthorized tortious acts are viewed as having 
been committed in the course of employment, and the employer is vicariously 
liable. Since the tortious act is committed in the course of employment, the 
act is deemed in law to have been committed on the employer’s behalf, and the 
employer is seen to have (jointly) produced it. Te tortious act is then legally 
attributable to the employer, grounding vicarious liability. 
In this account, the notion of enterprise risk lies at the doctrinal core of 
vicarious liability. Tis is not to deny that there are also several policy goals 
purportedly advanced by vicarious liability.72 Te frst is compensation: Plaintifs 
gain compensatory access to an entity that is more likely to be fnancially capable 
of satisfying a judgment (i.e., the employer enterprise with deeper pockets than its 
employees). Te second is deterrence: Vicarious liability incentivizes employers to 
carefully select, train, and supervise employees, and to discipline employees who 
act wrongfully. Te third is enterprise liability: Since enterprises advance their 
economic interests through assigning employment tasks to employees, it is fair 
to require enterprises to internalize the costs of torts committed by employees in 
the course of employment. Te fnal policy rationale is loss spreading: Enterprises 
are generally in good position to obtain liability insurance and spread its costs 
to consumers through higher prices. Nevertheless, the imposition of vicarious 
liability still depends on a particular doctrinal confguration constituted by 
enterprise risk: In the absence of the right kind of relation between the enterprise 
risk and the ensuing tortious act, there is no vicarious liability, even if some of the 
policy goals could still be advanced. 
In Bazley, the SCC emphasized that vicarious liability provides a fair means 
of compensating victims because the enterprise created the risk resulting in 
tortious conduct.73 It also cautioned that if employees’ tortious acts are not related 
to enterprise risk, imposing vicarious liability would wrongly reduce employers 
to being involuntary insurers, without suitably implicating the deterrence 
rationale.74 In this way, the Court tied the compensation and deterrence policies 
to the doctrinal requirement of enterprise risk. Te notion of enterprise risk is, 
then, the principled basis in tort to extend liability to employers for tortious harm 
committed by employees. It draws a link between the employee’s tortious act and 
the employer’s risk of employing the tortious actor to perform an assigned task. 
While vicarious liability may advance various social goals, such as compensation, 
72. London Drugs, supra note 45, La Forest J. 
73. Bazley, supra note 58 at paras 29-31. 
74. Ibid at para 36. 







deterrence, enterprise liability, or loss spreading, it only does so if the doctrinal 
requirement of enterprise risk is satisfed. 
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
As a practice of corrective justice, tort liability follows only if the plaintif’s loss is 
legally caused by a particular defendant’s tortious act, grounding the defendant’s 
agent-specifc liability and duty to repair. Te doctrine of vicarious liability 
appears, at frst glance, to be inconsistent with this liability structure, as employers 
are liable for the unauthorized tortious acts of employees, without tortious 
conduct of their own. It is true that vicarious liability is still rooted in employees’ 
actionable torts; it merely extends liability to employers where the torts are tied 
to risks of enterprise. However, this extension of liability to employers needs to 
be examined, as it obligates employers to repair plaintifs’ losses even though the 
risks of enterprise are not tortious, per se. Employers are then liable for losses they 
did not wrongfully cause. Perhaps, then, vicarious liability is an exception to the 
general principle that defendants’ agent-specifc liability attaches to their own 
tortious causation of harm. 
Tere are three general ways to conceptualize employers’ vicarious 
liability for unauthorized tortious acts committed by employees in the course 
of employment.75 Te frst conception is that employers are burdened with 
the liability costs of tortious acts, though they are not the responsible actors. 
Vicarious liability, in this view, is a re-distribution of liability costs to employers 
who are, purportedly, the optimal cost-bearers.76 It is not, however, a judgment 
about wrongful loss or outcome responsibility. As noted above, there are several 
policy rationales that partially explain the re-distribution of liability costs: 
compensation, deterrence, enterprise liability, and loss-spreading. 
My contention, however, is that vicarious liability can be explained 
consistently with tort’s structure of corrective justice. Te key to make sense 
of this, arguably, is the doctrinal notion of enterprise risk; it suggests that 
vicarious liability responds to employers’ special (agent-specifc) responsibility 
75. Te three conceptions—whether vicarious liability is a mere distribution of liability costs to 
employers, or refects a composite identity of employer-acting-through-employee, or fnally, 
whether it refects an attribution of the employee’s tortious act to the employer, may be 
represented, respectively, by the approaches of Guido Calabresi, Ernest Weinrib, and Robert 
Stevens. See Guido Calabresi, “Some Toughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts” 
(1961) 70 Yale LJ 499, at 543-45; Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 30 at 186-87; and Robert 
Stevens, Torts and Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 259-62. 
76. See e.g. Calabresi, supra note 75, at 543. 
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for the ensuing tort. Since it tracks enterprise risk, vicarious liability conveys 
that employers are, in some sense, outcome responsible for the tortious harm. 
Tis brings us to a second conception of vicarious liability: that the extension of 
liability to employers is actually a judgement about employers’ tortious causation 
of harm.77 Ernest Weinrib reasons, in this regard, that the agency relation between 
employers and employees afrms a legally constructed composite identity of 
employer-acting-through-employee: Since the employee is a mere cog in the 
enterprise, the employee’s tortious act is an extended act of the enterprise as a 
whole.78 Weinrib refers to this “composite” doer of harm as a “more inclusive legal 
persona,” a legal fction without empirical reality, refecting law’s construction of 
its own normative reality.79 In this view, the employer is viewed as a tortious actor 
and liable as a matter corrective justice: Vicarious liability constructs a normative 
link between employer and victim, since the employee’s tortious act is simply 
the act of the employer, as its principal. However, if an employee’s tortious act is 
unauthorized, vicarious liability follows only if the proper relation between the 
tortious act and the enterprise is established, so that the employee is regarded 
as having acted as part of the enterprise.80 Tis is the central role of enterprise 
risk: It establishes the requisite relation between the employee’s tortious act and 
the enterprise—in which the employment itself produces risk of the particular 
tortious act—to attribute the tortious act to the enterprise despite its apparent 
non-authorization. If this relation is present, the employer is legally viewed as the 
tortious actor—that is, as having wrongfully caused the plaintif’s loss, grounding 
its agent-specifc duty to repair. 
However, there is a worthy counter-argument to this composite-doer 
theory: It largely collapses the distinct roles of employees and employers in 
causing tortious harm. Te law distinguishes between their respective roles, 
as employers may seek indemnity from employees who cause unauthorized 
tortious harm in the course of business.81 If employers are actually the tortious 
actors and employees’ identities collapse as mere cogs in the enterprise, as the 
composite-doer conception suggests, it is illogical to legally empower employers 
to seek indemnity for their own tortious acts. 
77. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 30 at 186-87. 
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
80. See Meir Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self ” (1992) 105 Harv L 
Rev 959 at 981-82. 
81. Lister, supra note 45; London Drugs, supra note 45. 










Te assumption in this counter-argument is sound: As between employees 
and employers, the employees are the actual tortious actors. Employers may, 
therefore, seek indemnity from employees for unauthorized torts committed in the 
course of employment. At the same time, the employment relation has additional 
signifcance, in which employees act as extensions of the enterprise. Tis refects a 
two-fold legal signifcance of employment relations. On the one hand, employees 
are independent legal actors, subjects of potential personal liability to victims or 
indemnity to employers for their tortious acts. On the other hand, employees act 
to advance their employers’ purposes, not their own. Due to this latter feature, 
employees’ tortious acts may be sufciently tied to tasks of employment, and 
so attributable to the enterprise itself. Tis two-fold signifcance results in a 
multi-layered system of responsibility: As independent tortious actors, employees 
may be liable to indemnify employers for unauthorized torts committed in the 
course of employment. Simultaneously, employees’ tortious acts are attributable 
to employers with respect to victims outside the employment relation. 
Tis analysis suggests a third possible conception of vicarious liability, 
which features a subtle distinction between the tortious action and the tortious 
actor. While the employee is the tortious actor (the employer commits no 
initial tortious action), vicarious liability attributes the employee’s tortious act 
to the employer vis-à-vis the plaintif.82 Tis framing gives rise to a further 
question: if the employer is not the actual tortious actor, why is the tortious 
action attributed to the employer? It relates, arguably, to a notion of collective 
or associational responsibility stemming from the social arrangement of 
employment: an employee’s act also belongs to the employer when they act in a 
common pursuit.83 Tis is the doctrinal role of enterprise risk: It links employees’ 
unauthorized tortious acts to tasks of employment, and thereby, to the common 
pursuit of enterprise with which the employer is socially-identifed. Te employer 
82. Robert Stevens maintains that vicarious liability involves an attribution of the employees’ 
tortious act to the employer, not merely the liability. See Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights, 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at 259-62. 
83. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 80 at 985-86. As an illustration of collective responsibility, Meir 
Dan-Cohen ofers the example of a team, where individual members use the frst-person 
plural pronoun “we” to claim responsibility for acts of (other members of ) the team, even if 
they did not play in the particular game. Te collective team identity permits the attribution 
of acts by some individual members to other individual members. Te attribution of the 
act—and responsibility for the act—exists by virtue of a shared identifcation with the 
collective team identity. Tis provides insight into vicarious liability: since the employer 
and employee share a common identity, defned by the pursuit of enterprise, the tortious 
actions of an employee—though acting alone and unauthorized—may be attributable to the 
employer where sufciently linked to the pursuit of enterprise. 
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is then an additional individual responsibility base (i.e., in addition to the 
employee) for tortious harm occurring in the pursuit of enterprise. 
Tis third conception of vicarious liability—refecting employers’ 
identifcation with, and associational responsibility for, employees’ tortious 
acts—is, in my view, consistent with tort’s basic structure of agent-specifc 
liability. Tort liability involves a normative attribution of a plaintif’s loss to a 
defendant’s tortious act, as its legal cause. Vicarious liability involves this kind of 
normative attribution, but in way that is distinctly suitable to the employment 
context. It forms a particular legal construction of the employment relation: 
In cases of vicarious liability, employers and employees are seen to participate 
interdependently to produce tortious harm—that is, to jointly cause the 
tortious harm.84 As a result, the law empowers plaintifs with recourse against 
two defendants, employer and employee. In this way, the law recognizes the 
interdependence of employee and employer with respect to the commission of 
the tort: While the employee commits the completed tortious act, the potential 
for the tortious act was created by the employment itself. Tis does not mean the 
law construes the employer and employee as a single composite-doer-of-harm. 
Rather, the employer and employee are independent legal actors who jointly 
produce tortious harm, for which they are independent responsibility bases. 
Teir joint production of tortious harm is not identical. While the tortious act is 
committed by the employee, it is also normatively attributable to the employer 
(vis-à-vis the plaintif) due to the employer’s self-identifcation with the employee’s 
employment tasks, which comprise part of the collective goals of enterprise.85 
Te law, then, continues to view the employee as the tortious actor, and the 
employee is indeed a defendant in an immediate tort relation with the plaintif, 
and also potentially required to indemnify the employer. However, the tortious 
action also belongs to the employer, since it occurred in the course of employment 
with which the employer is inescapably associated. In this view, vicarious liability 
is not a re-allocation of liability costs to promote external policy goals. It refects 
an employer’s special responsibility for the wrongful loss, due to its legal association 
and identifcation with the tortious action: Te tortious causation of harm also 
belongs to the employer. Tis is a legal interpretation of the employment relation, 
where employers materially enhance the risk of employees committing specifc 
torts by providing a particular employment opportunity. While the foundation 
of liability remains the employee’s tortious act, liability is then extended to the 
84. Bazley, supra note 58 at para 19. 
85. On liability refecting self-identifcation of an actor with a tortious action, see Dan-Cohen, 
supra note 80 at 981-86. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL







employer, who is responsible for associated acts of employees relating to the 
common pursuit of enterprise. 
In this account, vicarious liability does not simply re-distribute liability 
costs of employees’ tortious accidents to employers; rather, it attributes employees’ 
tortious acts to employers. It does so by implicating the employment itself in 
the joint-production of tortious harm, drawing a normative link between the 
employee’s tortious act and the risks of employment. If employment materially 
enhances the risk of the ensuing tort, the tortious act is sufciently linked to 
the enterprise, despite being unauthorized. Te tortious harm is then attributed 
to both components of the collectivity of enterprise, empowering the plaintif 
to seek repair from two responsibility bases, employer and employee. Since the 
tortious act is also attributed to the enterprise itself, the employer could have an 
agent-specifc obligation to repair the plaintif’s loss. 
In sum, vicarious liability refects a special legal relation between employers 
and employees. Te employment relation recognizes the interdependence of 
employees and employers, as joint-producers of tortious harm while carrying 
out aims of enterprise. As independent legal actors, employees may be liable 
to victims (and employers) for torts committed in the course of employment. 
At the same time, vis-à-vis plaintifs, employees’ tortious acts are also legally 
attributable to employers. Tis layered liability outcome refects employees’ 
status as independent legal persons employed to act for the collective purposes 
of enterprise. It triggers liability consequences for employers who are, then, 
additional responsibility bases for tortious acts of the enterprise. 
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND AA-CAUSED HARM 
To review, the doctrinal problem of AA-caused harm refects the problematic 
nature of AAs’ social roles as mediators of human interaction. Emergent AAs 
are anticipated to perform tasks with a degree of functional independence. Te 
normative signifcance of AAs’ outward efects is not simply analogous to those 
of ordinary products. Since AAs are stimulated by environmental feedback, their 
efects are not necessarily traceable to human input. AA’s outward efects are also 
not analogous to those of natural events, since AAs are deliberately deployed 
by humans for human purposes. AAs are, then, more like functional actors. 
As noted above, the laws of negligence and strict liability likely decline liability 
for AA-caused harm because users or distributors are not the relevant actors that 
cause the harm; AAs were deliberately deployed to perform the tasks instead. 
Since human distributors or users of AAs commit no initial tortious act, they are 
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not exposed to liability. Tese doctrines do not capture, as potential grounds for 
liability, the relevance of (reasonably) deploying another actor to perform a task. 
Te doctrinal form of vicarious liability, however, ofers a promising 
solution to the problem of AA-caused harm, as it captures a form of associational 
responsibility for employing, or deploying, another actor to perform assigned 
tasks that increase risk of specifc kinds of tortious harm. Victims of AA-caused 
harm should aim at this argument: Deployment of AAs involves characteristic 
risk of misalignment and AA-caused harm, analogous to human employment 
that provides special opportunity for employees to commit specifc kinds of 
torts related to their tasks of employment. While deployment of AAs may not 
be unreasonably risky in the negligence sense, it involves characteristic risk of 
misalignment and AA-caused harm. It is comparable to employing human 
employees, which is not unreasonably risky in the negligence sense, but increases 
risks of tortious harm committed by employees. Notably, both human employees 
and AAs perform tasks to advance the goals of their employers and deployers, 
not their own. Moreover, both employers of human employees and deployers 
of AAs lack full operative control: Human employees can commit unauthorized 
tortious acts, and AAs’ functional independence risks undesirable misalignment 
and AA-caused harm. Accordingly, the argument goes, just as employers are seen 
to jointly-produce their employees’ tortious harm committed in the course of 
employment, so too should deployers of AAs be seen to jointly-produce AAs’ 
tortious harm committed in the course of deployment. 
Tis doctrinal solution is certainly controversial: it implicitly regards AAs as 
actors, rather than mere products. Critics may reasonably object to classifying 
inanimate artifacts as actors. In their view, automated vehicles or surgical robots 
are sophisticated tools, not more. Since AAs lack autonomy, intentional states, and 
consciousness, the argument goes, the analogy to human employees—legal and 
moral agents—is fctitious and potentially misleading. While employees’ actions 
can give efect to legal consequences—for both themselves and employers—AAs 
do not act at all. To attribute legal consequences to AAs’ tortious actions, then, 
is an artifcial and misconceived fction. 
In truth, the assumption in this criticism is sound: In developing a theory of 
liability for AA-caused harm, erroneous characterizations of AAs must be avoided, 
such as attributions of mental states and consciousness. It is also crucial to be aware 
of the legal fction that is involved in analogizing AAs to human employees. Te 
ascription of agency to AAs is a legal metaphor, not a scientifc or metaphysical 
description of their inner characteristics. Moreover, in selecting a liability 
category for AAs, it is best to not assume any particular reasonably-contested 










philosophical view about sophisticated technologies and artifcial intelligence, 
including positions in ongoing debates about whether technological artifacts can 
have autonomy or moral agency. Te liability question is about legal duties that 
human (or corporate) actors owe to each other when supplying or using AAs. Te 
liability determination should focus solely on the salient efects of AAs on human 
interaction, not on AAs’ ontological or moral status.86 Te proper role of legal 
metaphor is limited: to evaluate AAs’ normative position within legal relations— 
their impact on rights and duties of legal persons—not to conceptualize their 
general metaphysical character. Tis theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused 
harm, admittedly, adopts an intentional stance toward AAs, as legal actors, 
acting on behalf of human deployers.87 However, this intentional stance is not 
an afrmation of a particular philosophical view of emergent technology. It is a 
legal and normative interpretation of the social relation between deployers, AAs, 
and their tort victims, where AAs are deployed to advance deployers’ goals while 
producing characteristic risks of harm. 
Aside from the theoretical leap to view AAs as legal actors, applying vicarious 
liability to AA-caused harm entails several doctrinal incongruencies. As stated 
above, vicarious liability typically involves three components: (a) a tort; (b) 
committed by an employee; (c) in the course of employment. Vicarious liability 
for AA-caused harm should then involve three analogous components: a tort
committed by an AA, a deployee, in the course of deployment. Tere are several 
complications, however: Is there a way to diferentiate between various instances 
of AA-caused harm as tortious or non-tortious? Can AAs and their deployers 
compose legal relations comparable to employment, thereby empowering AAs to 
give efect to legal consequences for deployers? Is there a way to establish whether 
AAs act within, or outside, the scope of deployment? 
To impose vicarious liability in all instances of AA-caused harm would 
be, in efect, to impose an absolute liability standard, foreign to tort law. It is, 
therefore, necessary to discover a method to evaluate AA-caused harm as tortious 
or non-tortious. Establishing and defning the scope of legal agency relations 
between deployers and AAs, however, is especially problematic: If AAs are 
not legal persons, they presumably lack capacity to be party to legal relations. 
In this respect, the fact that human employees are legal persons has doctrinal 
consequences that may not be relevant in the context of AA-caused harm. First, 
under vicarious liability, employers may seek indemnity from employees. Tis is 
likely impossible in the context of AA-caused harm, unless legislation requires the 
86. See generally Jack B Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 47-48. 
87. Te intentional stance is discussed at Part III(A), below. 
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particular AA-tortfeasor to be insured. Moreover, where employees commit torts, 
plaintifs are entitled to sue the employees directly. Again, this aspect of vicarious 
liability cannot apply to AA-caused harm, unless legislation deems the particular 
AA-tortfeasor to be a legal person and suable. Tese doctrinal divergences stem 
from the fact that, in this account, AAs have an ambiguous and problematic legal 
identity. On the one hand, AAs are deemed to be legal actors, as their outward 
behaviours may be evaluated as tortious, grounding deployers’ vicarious liability. 
Yet, without legal personhood status, it is not clear that AAs can comprise legal 
agency relations and cause, by their own acts, legal efects for deployers. 
It is not self-evident that there is a plausible solution to these complications. 
It is not surprising that emergent technologies do not ft seamlessly within a 
pre-existing framework for torts committed by human employees. In the 
remainder of this article, nonetheless, I attempt a preliminary sketch of a theory 
of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm. A successful theory needs to account 
for divergences between the ordinary doctrinal elements of vicarious liability and 
its application in the context of AA-caused harm. It should also make explicit the 
legal conception of AAs that is implicit in the vicarious liability account. 
Let us begin by identifying the legal conception of AAs that is, in my view, 
implicit in the vicarious liability account. It involves recognizing a novel legal 
category for AAs: AAs are pure legal agents—that is, legal agents without 
legal personhood.88 As legal agents, AAs have legal capacity to trigger legal 
consequences for deployers (who are legal persons). However, as entities without 
legal personhood, AAs do not produce legal consequences on their own account. 
Te classifcation of AAs as legal agents without personhood can explain a 
diference between AAs and human employees in the way their respective agency 
relations would arise. AAs are deemed legal agents due to their inherent social 
role, as functional actors who act exclusively for deployers’ purposes and interests, 
not their own. By contrast, in the employment context, since human employees 
are also independent legal persons with personal purposes and interests, agency 
relations arise due to particular (contractual) choices of employees to enter into 
employment. Furthermore, classifying AAs as legal agents without personhood 
helps to explain the various doctrinal divergences outlined above. In typical 
instances of vicarious liability, the tort is committed by a legal agent who is also 
88. Tis category is proposed by Samir Chopra & Laurence F White, A Legal Teory for 
Autonomous Artifcial Agents (University of Michigan Press, 2011) at 25. A pure legal 
agency classifcation also responds to Ryan Calo’s suggestion that the law may need to adopt 
a “new category of legal subject, halfway between person and object.” “Robotics and Lessons 
of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 549. 










an independent legal person, grounding multiple responsibility bases; victims 
may sue either employees or employers, and employers may seek indemnity from 
employees. By contrast, in the context of AA-caused harm, since AAs are not 
legal persons, there is only one potential responsibility base: the deployers, not 
AAs themselves. 
In sketching a theory of pure legal agency, the point of departure is tort law 
and vicarious liability. Te legal conception of AAs that emerges in this account 
relates specifcally to the role of legal agency in vicarious liability, based on an 
analogy between AA deployment and human employment. My aim is to make 
explicit a certain legal and normative interpretation of AA-mediated interaction 
that is implicit in the application of vicarious liability to AA-caused harm. I now 
turn to consider each component of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm: (a) 
tortious harm; (b) committed by an AA deployee; (c) in the course of deployment. 
A. AAS AS TORTFEASORS: ADOPTING AN INTENTIONAL STANCE 
Te foundation of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm is a completed tort 
committed by an AA. AAs are, then, viewed as potential tortfeasors, as bases of 
deployers’ vicarious liability. Te rough idea is this: Te external actions of AAs 
are evaluated as tortious or non-tortious based on the degree of risk they pose 
to others. AAs’ external actions—not their inner-algorithmic mechanisms—are 
evaluated as tortious. Tis approach resembles tort law’s ordinary evaluation of 
tortious action. It considers whether particular external actions are consistent 
with systematic norms of rightful interaction, and an action is tortious if it 
poses a risk exceeding the level of risk typically assumed in ordinary patterns 
of interaction, as per an objective standard of care.89 Tort law does not typically 
judge the inner mechanisms causing actions, such as actors’ intentionality, 
nor does it judge the tortfeasors’ subjective blameworthiness.90 Te same goes 
for evaluating AAs’ actions under vicarious liability: AAs’ external actions are 
tortious if they impose excessive levels of risk to other persons and property, 
inconsistent with norms of rightful interaction, as expected of the reasonable 
person. For example, if a self-driving vehicle fails to notice a stop sign and injures 
a pedestrian in an intersection, the self-driving vehicle will have acted negligently 
if, and only if, a reasonable person (driver) would have noticed the stop sign and 
avoided collision. In this way, the liability determination side-steps problematic 
and expensive inquiry into the inner defectiveness of AAs’ algorithms, focussing 
89. Stephen Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk and the Law of Torts” in Gerald Postema, 
eds, Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 72 at 111. 
90. See Holmes, supra note 32. 
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instead on their outward behaviours and efects. It also thereby recognizes that 
AAs are not ordinary products; their sophisticated processes, outputs and efects 
resemble action. 
Some legal scholars have proposed viewing AAs as tortfeasors. Ryan Abbott, 
for instance, reasons that if computers carry out activities once performed 
exclusively by humans and cause similar kinds of harm, they should be viewed 
as potential tortfeasors.91 Abbott contrasts three kinds of cases that illustrate the 
relation between human action, technological artifacts, and applicable liability 
standards. In the frst case, a human crane operator incorrectly identifes a drop 
of location and drops a steel frame on a passerby.92 In this case, the operator’s 
error is the cause of harm, and liability is judged under the law of negligence.93 
In the second case, a human crane operator manipulates a crane properly and 
under normal conditions, yet the crane is defective and tips over, landing on a 
passerby.94 In this second case, the crane’s defectiveness is the cause of harm, and 
liability is evaluated as a matter of products liability, not based on the operator’s 
conduct.95 In the third case, an unmanned autonomous computer operates a 
crane, misidentifes the drop of location and drops the steel frame on a passerby.96 
Abbott states that under prevailing tort law, scenarios two and three are treated 
alike; in both instances, harm is caused by defective products, and liability is 
evaluated under the products liability regime.97 However, Abbott argues that 
scenario three—where the autonomous computer operator misidentifes the drop 
of location, dropping the frame on a passerby—is closely related to scenario one, 
where a human operator misidentifes the drop of location, dropping the frame 
on a passerby. Both scenarios involve the same kind of action and the same kind 
of physical result.98 In Abbott’s account, in the second case, the crane is a mere 
product, to be investigated for tortious defects. By contrast, in the third case, 
the “computer has stepped into the shoes of the worker; it has replaced a person, 
and it is performing in essentially the same manner as a person.”99 Terefore, 
Abbott reasons, in the third case, the autonomous crane should be viewed as a 
91. Ryan Abbott, “Te Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability” (2018) 
86 Geo Wash L Rev at 23. 
92. Ibid at 24. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid. 





















“computer tortfeasor,” and manufacturers’ liability should depend on whether 
the computer’s external actions are tortious, not its product-defectiveness.100 
Notably, since Abbott grounds manufacturers’ liability in the tortious actions of 
the machines they distribute, his theory is essentially a form of vicarious liability: 
He efectively deems computer tortfeasors to be agents of their manufacturers, 
thereby attributing computer torts to manufacturer principals. 
Similarly, in the automated-vehicle context, Jefrey Gurney proposes that 
the law treat manufacturers as drivers of automated vehicles they distribute, and 
that liability should be determined based on the vehicles’ (un)reasonable actions, 
not its product-defects.101 Gurney points out that automated vehicles provide 
little opportunity for driver control, especially when they are designed without 
steering wheels or breaks.102 As a result, with automated vehicles, liability shifts 
from drivers to driving systems, falling mainly on manufacturers.103 However, 
with respect to the theory of manufacturers’ liability, Gurney suggests that the 
law treat manufacturers as the drivers of automated vehicles, turning liability into 
a “simple matter under negligence,” rather than a “complicated matter under 
products liability.”104 Gurney warns that applying products liability to software 
and algorithmic defects is especially burdensome, not designed for everyday 
accidents.105 Products liability litigation would be enormously expensive, 
as it involves complex and specialized evidence about algorithms and sensor data, 
requiring expert witnesses.106 Gurney maintains that a reasonable driver standard 
can apply to automated vehicles.107 Like human drivers, autonomous vehicles 
would be expected, for instance, to drive within proper lanes. What happens if, 
in a particular instance, an autonomous vehicle crosses the centre line causing a 
harmful accident? If a reasonable driver would not have crossed the center line, 
the action is deemed tortious and its manufacturer is liable.108 Gurney’s theory 
is vicarious liability in form: tortious acts of automated vehicles are attributed to 
their manufacturers. While Gurney does not explicitly acknowledge the parallel 
100. Ibid at 26. 
101. Jefrey K Gurney, “Imputing Driverhood: Applying a Reasonable Driver Standard to 
Accidents Caused by Autonomous Vehicles” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, 
eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 
2017) 51 at 59-60. 
102. Ibid at 53. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid at 59. 
105. Ibid at 60. 
106. Ibid at 55. 
107. Ibid at 61. 
108. Ibid. 
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to vicarious liability, his own phrase, “imputing driverhood,” nicely captures 
the idea of agency, where actions of agents are attributed to their principals (not 
merely the resultant liability costs of actions, as elaborated upon above, in Part II). 
In evaluating AAs’ outward actions as tortious—rather than inspecting their 
inner-algorithmic-design for product defects—the law implicitly adopts a legal 
intentional stance toward AAs as legal actors.109 In this respect, I allude to a 
central concept in intentional systems theory, formulated by Daniel Dennett.110 
In brief, Dennett sets out three basic stances used to interpret or predict the 
behaviour of other objects or entities. Te frst is the physical stance, where an 
object’s physical constitution and the laws of physics are used to predict what an 
object will do. Te physical stance is typically used, for instance, when predicting 
the outcome of releasing a stone from one’s hand.111 Te second is the design 
stance, where an assumption is made that an object is designed to function in a 
particular way, and its behaviour is predicted based on this assumption.112 Te 
design stance is adopted with respect to objects like alarm clocks or chainsaws, 
where users typically assume that if they follow design instructions, the objects 
will operate as they are designed to function.113 It is greatly impractical to predict 
or interpret the behaviour of these objects using a physical stance, to scrutinize 
their physical properties and the laws of physics to work out how to manipulate 
them efectively.114 Te third is the intentional stance, where an object is treated 
as an agent, with beliefs and desires, as well as the rationality to implement these 
imputed beliefs and desires.115 According to Dennett, the intentional stance is 
useful where an object’s behaviour is extremely complicated and most-easily 
predicted or interpreted by attributing to it a sense of rationality and goal-oriented 
behaviour.116 For instance, to win a game of chess against a computer, it is best 
to predict the computer’s moves as if it is a rational agent who knows the rules of 
chess and wants to win the game. Tis approach is more efective than inspecting 
its internal design, to calculate the many lines of computer code that determine 
109. Chopra and White generally argue in favour of adopting an intentional stance towards AAs. 
See Chopra & White, supra note 88 at 11-17. 
110. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems Teory” in Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P McLaughlin 
& Sven Walter, eds, Te Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 339. 
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its next move.117 As Dennett emphasizes, in instances like chess-playing, the 
intentional stance works because the computer is designed to “‘reason’ about the 
best move to make in the highly rationalistic setting of chess.”118 Te intentional 
stance may then be appreciated as a sub-species of the design stance: Te 
intentional stance works because the object is designed to behave rationally.119 
Dennett also extends this key insight to human interaction: Humans 
view each other as intentional systems, using attributions of beliefs, desires, 
and rationality to anticipate or interpret human action, while remaining 
ignorant (for the most part) of peoples’ actual internal mental processes.120 
In this view, the intentional stance is adopted with respect to a continuum of 
intentional systems, including humans, animals, and sophisticated artifacts—a 
range of instances where the attribution of intentional states gives meaning 
to behaviour where internal states are largely unknown.121 Moreover, Dennett 
rejects the notion that, for sophisticated technological artifacts, the intentional 
stance is merely derived intentionality, but not original intentionality, or that it 
is metaphorical, not literal.122 Te point is that the intentional stance works to 
predict or interpret the object’s behaviour regardless of whether the attributed 
goals are really appreciated, genuine or otherwise. Tere are still diferences 
between various intentional systems; some are simple, others more complex.123 
Dennett distinguishes between frst-order intentional systems—whose behaviour 
is predictable by attributing beliefs or desires to it—and second-order (or third 
or fourth, et cetera) systems, whose behaviour is predictable by attributing to 
it beliefs about beliefs (or desires). In Dennett’s view, however, the intentional 
stance exploits the “deep similarity” between the whole continuum of intentional 
systems to investigate the diferences between them.124 Te intentional stance is, 
then, a “theory-neutral way of capturing the cognitive competences of diferent 
organisms (or other agents) without committing the investigator to overspecifc 
hypotheses about the internal structures that underlie the competences.”125 
Returning to tort law, to view AAs as tortfeasors is to assume an intentional 
stance toward AAs, conceived of as legal actors. Te liability determination turns 
117. Ibid at 341. 
118. Ibid. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Ibid at 341-42. 
121. Ibid at 342-43. 
122. Ibid at 343. 
123. Ibid at 344. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Ibid. 
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on whether their actions are consistent with the norms of rightful interaction. 
It does not turn on whether they are defective products due to tortious actions 
by other legal persons (i.e., manufacturers or designers). To legally regard AAs’ 
outward efects as actions—and subject to norms of rightful interaction— 
represents a legal move toward an intentional stance, away from a design stance. 
Typically, with respect to products, the law assumes a design stance: Te product is 
expected to function according to its marketed design and operating instructions. 
If it does not, the law investigates whether it was designed, manufactured, or used 
tortiously by a responsible legal subject. Under a design stance, the law does not 
consider whether the product acted wrongfully, as the product does not act in 
the requisite legal sense. Rather, product defectiveness triggers an investigation 
of its legally responsible cause by an action of its manufacturer, designer, or user. 
By contrast, in applying vicarious liability to AA-caused harm, the law adopts 
an intentional stance: Tort analysis revolves around the reasonableness of AAs’ 
external actions. Te law elevates AAs’ outward efects to the realm of legal action, 
with legal capacity to commit torts. 
To be clear, in this context, to adopt an intentional stance is to assume 
AAs’ outward efects are actions for the purposes of tort law, circumventing the 
need to further investigate the actions of manufacturers, designers, or users. 
Crucially, however, the legal intentional stance should not implicate any further 
philosophical positions, such as the general appropriateness of attributing mental 
states to sophisticated technologies, as under intentional systems theory. It would 
be a mistake for the law to take a position on any particular philosophy of mind. 
Accordingly, this vicarious liability account does not take a position on whether 
intentional systems theory is a suitable way to make sense of commonly used 
mentalistic terms such as beliefs, desires, or intentions. It also does not take a 
position on whether humans, animals, and technological artifacts represent a 
genuine continuum of related intentional systems. I emphasize, in this respect, 
that under standard accounts of agency, AAs are not truly agents, as originators 
of something that counts as action.126 According to standard accounts, to count 
as actions, one’s doings must be causally related to particular intentional mental 
126. Kenneth Einar Himma, “Artifcial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral 
Agency: What Properties Must an Artifcial Agent Have To Be a Moral Agent?” (2009) 11 
Ethics Info Tech 19 at 20-29. 













states, such as a belief and desire pair or volition.127 Crucially, if agency implicates 
intentional mental states, it also presupposes consciousness, as mental states are 
privately observable by introspection.128 Pursuant to standard accounts of agency, 
therefore, absent mental states and consciousness, AAs cannot be agents at all.129 
Nevertheless, intentional systems theory helps to illuminate the legal move 
to vicarious liability for AA-caused harm. It involves an altered stance: (1) to 
view AAs as rational actors that carry out goal-oriented tasks for human or 
corporate deployers; and (2) to evaluate AAs’ actions according to an objective 
standard of rightful interaction. It is still crucial to acknowledge, however, that 
adopting an intentional stance is a legal fction. If the outward efects of AAs 
are deemed to be actions for liability purposes, it is necessary to confront and 
reject the implicit supposition that AAs have (something comparable to) mental 
states causing their outward efects. After all, in ordinary instances, tort actions 
are necessarily expressions of volition, implicating a cluster of intentional states, 
such as intentions to act, beliefs, and desires (including second-order beliefs and 
desires).130 To treat AAs as legal agents—elevating their outward efects to the 
realm of tortious action—problematically ensnares the possibility of artifcial 
agency. I therefore emphasize that adopting an intentional stance toward AAs is 
a liability maneuver: AAs’ agency is a legal fction, not the legal recognition of a 
pre-existing metaphysical truth.131 
127. Ibid at 20. Moreover, under standard accounts, moral agency—that is, to be subject to moral 
obligations and to be held accountable for one’s actions—necessarily involves two further 
capacities. First, the capacity to freely act, which necessarily entails—under both libertarian 
and compatibilist conceptions—that actors (directly) cause their own behaviour and are not 
directly compelled by something external. Second, the capacity to engage in moral reasoning, 
which includes the ability to identify moral concepts and principles—to diferentiate wrong 
from right—and apply them to specifc contexts. Ibid at 21-24. 
128. Ibid at 24-27. 
129. Ibid at 28-29. 
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 2 (1965). 
131. I do not mean to use the term legal fction in a pejorative sense. AAs’ legal agency is a fction 
in the sense that it does not necessarily correspond to some real metaphysical truth about 
artifcial agency. However, as a legal fction, it is a conceptual and normative interpretation 
of the relational structure of AA-mediated human interaction, which is, in my view, coherent 
and justifed as a matter of tort law, as argued below in the text. As a general matter, since 
AA-caused harm demands reconstruction of tort doctrine, involving new forms of analogical 
reasoning, it is not surprising if it also involves making use of a legal fction. On this point, 
see LL Fuller, “Legal Fictions” (1931) 25 Ill L Rev 513 at 527-28. Fuller observes that 
“[d]eveloping felds of law, felds where new social and business practices are necessitating a 
reconstruction of legal doctrine, nearly always present ‘artifcial construction,’ and, in many 
cases, outright fctions.” 
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However, this gives rise to the following questions: Is this legal fction 
coherent and justifed as a matter of tort law? Is it feasible to adopt an intentional 
stance toward AAs’ outward efects, deemed to be tortious actions, without 
taking a position on the possibility of artifcial agency? In my view, adopting 
this legal fction is both intelligible and sensible, as a matter of tort law. First, 
under intentional systems theory, the move to an intentional stance is justifed 
if the intentional stance enables better prediction or interpretation of an entity’s 
behaviour than under the alternative physical or design stances. Te liability 
maneuver to adopt an intentional stance follows similar reasoning, though with 
a legal spin: Liability for AAs’ harmful efects is more easily addressed under 
an intentional stance—by evaluating their external behaviours—than under a 
design stance, entailing onerous scrutiny of AAs’ defective algorithms. To insist 
on products liability for AA-caused harm is the legal equivalent of attempting to 
beat a chess-playing-computer by inspecting its internal design and calculating 
its many lines of code. Jefrey Gurney emphasizes this point: “Treating the 
manufacturer as the driver makes what would have been a complicated matter 
under products liability a simple matter under negligence.”132 Accordingly, 
adopting an intentional stance toward AAs—as a legal fction—serves a worthy 
and pragmatic legal purpose: to streamline the liability evaluation. 
Second, tort law involves judgement about external actions, not actors’ inner 
mental states or subjective blameworthiness. It may be conceded that since tort 
involves judgment of actions, the object of judgment is typically an expression of 
volition, implicating a mental state. Nevertheless, while the existence of a mental 
state is typically a pre-condition of tortious action, it is not the mental state itself 
that is judged as tortious. Tort liability does not respond to defendants’ moral 
blameworthiness; it responds to external actions that are inconsistent with norms 
of rightful interaction, defned by an objective standard of care. Tort liability 
typically obligates defendants to repair losses caused by acts that are inconsistent 
with these norms, regardless of whether the actor could have acted diferently in 
the particular circumstances. Tis approach can be coherently extended to the 
outward efects of AAs that are action-like, such as where a self-driving car fails 
to stop at a stop-sign and causes a harmful accident. Tort liability may assess 
whether their behaviours are consistent with objective standards of interaction 
expected of reasonable persons without declaring that AAs have, or do not have, 
intentional states. 
Tird, adopting an intentional stance toward AAs is arguably justifed in the 
context of vicarious liability, which plainly attributes AAs’ actions to deployers. 
132. Gurney, supra note 101 at 59. 







Since AAs are pure legal agents, the implicit ascription of intentionality to AAs 
actually belongs to their human or corporate deployers. If AAs are viewed as 
goal-oriented actors, it is really the deployers’ goals that are referenced. AAs’ legal 
agency, in this sense, encompasses a larger system: AAs as extensions of deployers. 
As pure legal agents, AAs’ actions express deployers’ intentional states, goals, and 
rationality—not their own. AAs’ pure legal agency status is then a conceptual and 
normative interpretation of their deployers’ extended actions: deployers-acting-
through-their-deployees. In this respect, I retrieve the interpretation of vicarious 
liability where employer and employee are construed as a composite doer. 
In the context of AAs, this construction is particularly illuminating. Since AAs 
do not have independent legal standing, their intentional actions belong solely 
to their principals. AAs’ outward efects are deemed to be intentional actions 
because AAs are designed and deployed to rationally achieve assigned tasks. 
AAs’ actions should thus be viewed as extensions of deployers’ intentionality. 
Te evaluations of AAs’ actions could then serve as surrogates for evaluating the 
responsibility of deployers. 
In sum, viewing AAs as tortfeasors entails adopting an intentional stance in 
which AAs have legal capacity to commit tortious acts. Tis is a pragmatic liability 
maneuver with plausible theoretical foundations. Tort law can coherently evaluate 
AAs’ outward efects as tortious actions without taking a position on whether 
they (can) have actual intentional states. After all, tort evaluations are judgments 
about external actions, not the intentional states that motivate them. Moreover, 
in the context of AAs, adopting an intentional stance is best understood as a legal 
interpretation of a larger system, consisting of both deployers and AAs: AAs’ 
actions are extensions of deployers’ intentionality. Treating AAs as tortfeasors 
is, then, intrinsically tied to their position within agency relations, as deployees, 
to which I turn next. 
B. AAS’ DEPLOYMENT AS AN AGENCY RELATION 
Vicarious liability applies to torts committed by employees in the course of 
employment. In the context of AA-caused harm, pursuant to an intentional 
stance, AAs may be deemed to be tortfeasors. However, to complete vicarious 
liability, AAs need to be part of legally recognized deployment relations, permitting 
attribution of AAs’ tortious actions to deployers, analogous to employees’ tortious 
acts committed in the course of employment. For obvious reasons, as mentioned 
above, AAs cannot enter legal agency relations by choice (in contrast to typical 
employment scenarios). Instead, in this vicarious liability account, the law would 
treat deployed AAs as inherent legal agents. Since AAs are deployed to achieve 
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their deployers’ purposes, not their own, they inherently function in a way that 
is characteristic of legal agents. AAs occupy a unique middle-ground, as legal 
agents without personhood: Tey are instrumentally rational actors, but without 
their own purposes. Tis conception provides a theoretical foundation for the 
argument that AAs’ tortious actions are extensions of deployers’ intentionality, 
and therefore, a surrogate for evaluating the responsibility of deployers as a 
matter of vicarious liability. 
To illustrate this legal conception, I turn to philosophy of technology 
literature dealing with the moral signifcance of technological artifacts. Broadly 
speaking, there are two important debates about the ascription of moral agency 
to sophisticated technological artifacts.133 Te frst is the autonomy debate: 
whether artifacts are “mere instruments,” their efects “fully explicable in terms 
of designer and user intentions,” or whether artifacts may have a “degree of 
autonomy,” actively causing efects in the world as goal-driven agents.134 Te 
second is the moral relevance debate: whether artifacts are necessarily “morally 
neutral means” to various human ends, or whether artifacts can be, in their own 
respect, “morally responsible agents.”135 As Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers 
argue, the moral-relevance debate is largely dependent on the autonomy debate. 
Proponents of the moral neutrality position place “all moral weight on the 
intentionality of the users and designers,” viewing artifacts as mere instruments 
of these human intentions.136 Correspondingly, proponents of the position 
ascribing moral responsibility to artifacts also ascribe a degree of autonomy and 
agency to these artifacts, as active causes of morally signifcant efects.137 
Tis framing admittedly oversimplifes the diversity of opinion about 
artifcial moral agency; it is meant to capture the two poles—the most extreme 
positions—of the debate. My aim is to highlight specifc formulations of 
technological artifacts’ moral status, falling in between these two extremes, that 
illuminate the theoretical foundation of AAs’ pure legal agency category. Deborah 
Johnson, for instance, argues that computer systems can be moral entities, but 
not independent, autonomous moral agents.138 To begin, Johnson distinguishes 
between artifacts—as physical objects—and technology, which is a “combination 
133. Christian Illies & Anthonie Meijers, “Artefacts Without Agency” (2009) 92 Monist 420. 
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of artifacts, social practices, social relationships, and systems of knowledge.”139 
Johnson maintains that “artifacts are abstractions from reality:” To identify an 
artifact—as an independent object or entity—is to mentally separate it from 
the social context that gives it meaning and function.140 Technological artifacts, 
such as computers and computer systems, exist due to, and as part of, complex 
systems of (human) social practices.141 Johnson argues that the moral signifcance 
of computers cannot be conceived at “levels of abstraction that separate machine 
behaviour from the social practices of which it is a part and the humans who design 
and use it.”142 As Johnson forcefully reasons: “No matter how independently, 
automatically, and interactively computer systems of the future behave, they will 
be products (direct or indirect) of human behaviour, human social institutions, 
and human decision.”143 
Johnson also suggests that computer systems cannot be moral agents because 
they lack the capacity for voluntary behaviour that is essential to moral agency.144 
According to the standard formulation, voluntary intentional action entails 
an internal mental state causing an outward embodied event with an outward 
efect—harm or beneft—on a recipient of the action (a patient).145 Accordingly, 
voluntary intentional behaviour involves a reason explanation, not only a causal 
explanation: Voluntary actions can be explained by mental states, such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions to act.146 Johnson emphasizes that computer system 
behaviour can occur where computers’ internal states cause outward embodied 
events, with outward efects on patients.147 Crucially, however, for computers, 
the inner state (causing outward efects) is not a mental state (i.e., an intention to 
act), but some other mechanistic necessity.148 Computer behaviour is amenable 
only to causal explanation, not reason explanation. Computer behaviour, then, 
does not entail free voluntary action and cannot ground moral agency.149 Johnson 
acknowledges that machine learning techniques can enable computer behaviour 
that is, in her words, non-deterministic—i.e., not directly linked to programmers’ 
139. Ibid at 197. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Ibid. 
142. Ibid at 198. 
143. Ibid at 197. 
144. Ibid at 198-200. 
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input—as in the case of neural networks.150 However, she maintains that, “we 
have no way of knowing whether the non-deterministic character of human 
behaviour and non-deterministic behaviour of computer systems are or will be 
alike in the morally relevant (and admittedly mysterious) way.”151 
Johnson still maintains, however, that embodied computer systems are not 
morally neutral symbolic systems. Since they behave in the world—potentially 
producing efects on moral patients—mechanistic computer systems can 
have moral character, including intentionality (though without intentions 
to act).152 According to Johnson, computer systems’ intentionality relates to its 
programmed functions, “to behave in certain ways, given certain input,” that is, 
to transform certain inputs into particular kinds of outputs.153 Johnson argues 
that the intentionality of computer systems is connected to the intentionality 
of its designers and users.154 When designing computer systems, designers 
“poise them to behave in certain ways;” the computer systems then “remain 
poised to behave in those ways.”155 Likewise, the intentionality of computer 
systems remains latent without user activation.156 In this way, computer system 
intentionality is twofold: While dependent on initial human intentionality of 
designers and users, once initiated, computer systems independently produce 
certain intended states of afairs without further human intervention.157 Johnson 
reasons that while computer systems—taken independently—are not moral 
agents, they are components of a broader moral analysis involving a triad of 
intentionality: that of users, designers, and computer systems.158 Where humans 
use computer systems to achieve particular tasks, the computer systems do not 
act alone. Te computer system is “part of an action but it is not alone an actor;” 
rather, the “triad of designer, artifact and user act(ed) as one.”159 Accordingly, 
while machines cannot be moral agents, they are moral entities. As components 
of human moral agency, they aid particular kinds of human action, and enable 
extended human intentionality and efcacy—that is, actions that are otherwise 
150. Ibid at 200. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid at 200-201. 
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more difcult or impossible.160 Johnson also argues that computer behaviour 
expresses designers’ and users’ intentionality even where designers and users 
are unable to predict precisely what the computer system will do.161 In these 
instances, designers and users are simply engaging in risky behaviour, initiating 
actions with consequences that they cannot foresee. However, the computer 
behaviour still expresses intentionality and efcacy that its designers and users 
“put into the world.”162 
In a similar vein, Johnson and Tomas Powers recommend thinking about 
computers’ moral agency as a kind of surrogate agency.163 In standard accounts 
of agency, moral agents act from a frst-person perspective, pursuing their own 
interests based on their own beliefs about the world.164 By contrast, surrogate 
agents act (primarily) from a third-person perspective, pursuing the interests of 
their clients, not their own.165 Johnson and Powers reason that computer systems’ 
agency is akin to that of surrogate agents: “[Tey] are designed and deployed 
to do tasks assigned to them by humans.”166 Importantly, this argument does 
not depend on whether computer systems have actual autonomy, and largely 
bypasses the artifcial intelligence debate. Rather, it is the link between computer 
systems and human interests that makes computer systems objects of moral 
evaluation.167 Johnson and Powers reject the impulse to speak about computers’ 
actions in psychological terms, as computer systems do not have their own 
frst-person interests, nor a moral psychology.168 Computer systems (exclusively) 
advance second-order interests: Tey represent users’ interests and functionally 
perform tasks on their behalf.169 Computer systems’ second-order interests are 
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computer program and user input.170 Tis marks a signifcant contrast with 
human surrogate agents, who need to psychologically align their personal 
frst-order interests with their second-order interests pursuant to the third-person 
perspective required for the job.171 
Johnson and Powers emphasize that in evaluating moral responsibility for 
computer behaviour, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on human designers and 
users, ignoring the special role of computer systems which “constrain, facilitate 
and…shape what humans do.”172 At the same time, they deny that computer 
systems can be morally responsible since they do not have their own frst-order 
interests, nor the moral psychology or freedom required under standard accounts 
of moral agency.173 Johnson and Powers acknowledge that they have not precisely 
defned the instances where designers or users may—or may not—be responsible, 
liable, or rightly-blamed for behaviour of computer systems.174 Nevertheless, 
their framing of computer systems—as surrogate agents and extensions of human 
intentionality—is valuable. It highlights a distinctive kind of normative relation 
between human deployers and sophisticated technologies they deploy—the kind 
of relation that the law could capture with a pure legal agency category. 
Another notable view is the composite agency theory, also known as extended 
agency theory, formulated by F. Allan Hanson.175 Hanson’s theory begins with 
the uncontroversial idea that responsibility for a deed typically falls upon its 
doer.176 However, where both human and nonhuman entities are necessary to 
accomplish a certain deed, Hanson argues that both human and non-human 
components comprise the relevant agency, “the doer of the deed.”177 At the core 
of composite agency theory is the contention that “humans do not and cannot 
act alone in order to accomplish what they do.”178 Rather, action is undertaken by 
“inter-related combinations of human and nonhuman elements.”179 Te causal 
170. Ibid. 
171. Ibid at 260. 
172. Ibid at 269. 
173. Ibid at 270. 
174. Ibid at 269. 
175. F Allan Hanson, “Which Came First, the Doer or the Deed?” in Peter Kroes & Peter-Paul 
Verbeek, eds, Te Moral Status of Technical Artifacts (Springer Science+Business Media, 2014) 
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176. Ibid at 56. 
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179. F Allan Hanson, “Te Anachronism of Moral Individualism and the Responsibility of 
Extended Agency” (2008) 7 Phenomenology & Cognitive Sci 415 at 416 [Hanson, 
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responsibility for an action’s consequences, then, lies with the extended agency 
as a whole, which includes all necessary components of the action, both human 
and nonhuman.180 In this view, the notion of agency is fuid, defned to include 
“the lines of communication essential to [the] activity,” its components varying 
with the nature of the activity.181 In composite agency theory, the doer is more 
precisely identifed as a verb—“an embodied activity”—rather than a noun, as “a
collection of objects”.182 
Hanson argues further: If action is explained in terms of composite agencies, 
the reduction of moral agency to human individuals is unwarranted.183 Since 
moral responsibility lies with doers of deeds that have moral pertinence, the 
moral responsibility inquiry needs to isolate the relevant doer in any given 
situation. If the action is comprised of both human and nonhuman elements, 
the particular composite agency is the doer, the morally responsible agency.184 
According to Hanson, moral responsibility is not fundamentally distinct from 
causal responsibility: “It is a quality of causal responsibility that applies when the 
act has benefcial or detrimental consequences.”185 Where a composite agency 
acts with moral import—for example, causing harmful accident—the composite 
agency is morally responsible.186 
Hanson’s composite agency theory rejects the standard assumptions of 
methodological individualism, which reduces social behaviour to the actions of 
human individuals.187 According to standard individualist accounts, machines, 
computers, and animals are mere objects that human agents manipulate in the 
course of their actions; they are not components of agency.188 Methodological 
individualism predominantly rests on a modernist social frame: It conceives of 
the autonomous human individual as the most basic social unit, as an agent 
retaining a fxed identity while carrying out a variety of deeds over extended 
periods of time.189 In this view, the human doer precedes the deed, and “remains 
stable as it moves from one deed to another.”190 By contrast, composite agency 
180. Ibid at 418. 
181. Hanson, “Doer or the Deed”, supra note 175 at 61. 
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theory adopts a radically diferent account of agency, where “[t]he doer is defned 
by the deed.”191 In this view, there are no stable agents, only indefnite varieties of 
doers—that is, composite agencies—as defned by indefnite varieties of possible 
deeds.192 Composite agency theory refects a postmodern social frame, rejecting 
humanistic assumptions about the stable and centred autonomous nature of 
human agents.193 It emphasizes the fuidity and indeterminacy of human agency, 
insisting that humans only exist in relation to the nonhuman, which underlies its 
embrace of an expanded ethical realm to include machine ethics.194 
Hanson acknowledges that attributing moral responsibility to a composite 
agency as a whole is unconventional because nonhuman artifacts lack mental 
qualities such as awareness, intention, and foresight, which are indispensable 
to moral agency.195 Nevertheless, Hanson argues that intentional acts are more 
precisely undertaken by, and attributable to, composite agencies consisting of 
both human and nonhuman components.196 Hanson concedes that moral 
agency necessarily includes a human component with mental qualities, entailing 
the capacity for intelligent performance. Yet, he insists that an intelligent 
performance is still attributable to the composite agency as a whole, for it could not 
occur—nor could it even be intended—without contribution from nonhuman 
components as well.197 After all, the possibility of particular actions is informed 
by particular means that are, or are not, available. In this sense, Hanson reasons 
that humans are changed by the technologies they use. For instance, he argues 
that “a-man-with-a-gun is a diferent being than the same man without a gun”; 
they are diferent moral subjects with distinct capabilities.198 To be clear, Hanson 
does not claim that technological artifacts themselves can be morally responsible. 
He attributes moral responsibility to a composite agency as a whole; as the 
precise cause of actions and efects, the composite agency is the relevant moral 
subject.199 Te attribution of moral responsibility then extends to all components 
of a composite agency as joint responsibility. Moral responsibility necessarily 
extends to the human component, the locus of intentionality; however, the moral 
191. Ibid. 
192. Ibid. 
193. Ibid at 65. 
194. Ibid at 65-66. 
195. Ibid at 63. 
196. Ibid at 64. 
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evaluation also encompasses nonhuman components that enable the particular 
intentional act (that is, as an act that could actually be intended).200 
To return to tort law, these philosophical conceptions of technological 
artifacts as extending human agency can help construe the kind of normative 
relation between human deployers and AAs that is implicit in vicarious liability. 
As elaborated upon above in Part II, the kind of agent-specifc responsibility that 
is captured by vicarious liability is explainable in two ways. First, it may refect 
a conception of employer and employee as a composite doer: employer-acting-
through-employee. Alternatively, it may involve the legal attribution of the 
employee’s tortious act to the employer, refecting the employer’s associational 
responsibility for the act due to the employer’s identifcation with the employee’s 
acts committed in the course of employment, i.e., in collective pursuit of 
enterprise. In the context of AA deployment, the composite doer conception 
is especially apt: Since AAs act solely for their deployers’ interests—they do not 
have interests of their own—their actions may be viewed as legal extensions 
of their deployers’ intentionality. Johnson makes this point by highlighting 
the “triad of intentionality”—of designers, users, and computer systems—as 
essentially intertwined components of a single moral analysis. Likewise, Hanson’s 
conception of composite agency points to a robust conception of joint action 
and joint responsibility, where both human intentionality and AAs’ functionality 
combine to cause morally signifcant efects such as accidental harm. Te legal 
upshot is that judging AAs’ actions as tortious must be part of a broader legal 
analysis linked to the deployment relation as a whole. Te critical argument is 
this: Te evaluation of AAs’ actions as tortious—pursuant to a legal intentional 
stance—acquires its normative meaning from the deployer-AA relation. 
It is problematic to assess AAs’ tortious actions independently—abstracted from 
the deployment relation—as this severs AAs’ (tortious) actions from their source 
of intentionality. Accordingly, vicarious liability for AA-caused harm refects a 
composite doer or associational conception of the deployment relation, where 
both human and AA components jointly produce tortious harm. Te evaluation 
of AAs’ actions as tortious can then serve as a surrogate for evaluating tortious 
responsibility of deployers.201 
200. Ibid at 96-97. 
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Tis is certainly not a wholesale legal endorsement of Hanson’s composite 
agency theory or Johnson’s surrogate agency theory. Tese theories contain 
several features that should be distinguished from the issue of tort liability for 
AA-caused harm. First, they are about moral agency and moral responsibility, 
not legal agency and legal responsibility. Second, they apply to a broader class of 
technological artifacts, not only emergent AAs with functional autonomy. Tird, 
Hanson’s rejection of methodological individualism is probably inconsistent 
with the corrective justice account of tort, which rests on the possibility that 
responsibility for wrongful interaction is typically reducible to individual human 
agents. Finally, Hanson’s conception of moral responsibility—which extends 
to all composite agencies—is a special kind of causal responsibility where acts 
have morally signifcant consequences, causing beneft or harm. In the corrective 
justice account, by contrast, tort liability involves wrongful causation of harm. 
Absent breach of duty, causation of loss is insufcient to ground liability, despite 
the moral signifcance of harm caused. Tort liability is not a practice of pure 
causal responsibility. 
Nevertheless, these theories contain a key insight that is instructive in cases 
of AA-caused harm: Te legal evaluation of AAs’ actions must relate to the 
deployment relation as a whole, where AAs’ tortious actions stand in as surrogates 
for deployers’ actions. I stress that this is a legal conception, native to vicarious 
liability, a tort doctrine that captures a form of social interaction whereby a social 
actor is bound by the acts of an associated actor. In the context of AAs, vicarious 
liability refects special responsibility for deploying AAs to perform particular 
tasks of deployment, producing the characteristic risk of misalignment and 
(tortious) AA-caused harm. I concede that adopting an intentional stance toward 
AAs is controversial. But it is justifed in the context of pure legal agency, where 
the legal analysis maintains the form of vicarious liability, implicating a broader 
deployment relation (that includes human intentionality), not AAs’ independent 
moral character. 
C. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DEPLOYMENT 
I have so far suggested that the deployment of AAs may be viewed as a legal agency 
relation between deployers and AAs, akin to an employment relation. Te tortious 
acts of AAs committed in the course of deployment could then be attributed to 
deployers. However, this leads to a further question: How does one assess whether 
tortious actions of AAs fall within the scope of the deployment (agency) relation? 
If AAs’ outward actions could fall outside scope of deployment, deployers would 
be able to disclaim the tortious acts of their AAs as unauthorized and frolic-like. 















Tis potentially undermines the application of vicarious liability for AA-caused 
harm. David Vladeck cautions, in this respect, that if an autonomous machine 
acts in ways not pre-ordained by their initial programming—deciding for itself 
what course of action to take—the agency relation may breakdown.202 
I aim to push back against Vladeck’s view: Under vicarious liability, 
employers can be liable for unauthorized tortious acts of employees, provided 
such acts are sufciently related to their assigned tasks of employment. Even 
prohibited conduct still falls within the course of employment where it can be 
regarded as a mode—albeit an improper one—of carrying out authorized acts of 
business.203 Recall the infuential case, Ira S Bushey, where an employee tortiously 
turned wheels on a drydock wall causing the ship to fall against the drydock, 
which had no legitimate business rationale.204 Nevertheless, the Court found it 
to be part of the seafaring activity, as it took place on the ship while attending to 
seafaring matters.205 In that case, the crucial factor grounding vicarious liability 
was that the risk of that kind of tortious damage to the drydock was characteristic 
of the seafaring enterprise, which employed seamen who recurrently crossed the 
drydock while drunk.206 While the particular actions of the employee were not 
authorized business activities, they were sufciently linked to the enterprise and 
the employment relation as a whole. Likewise, recall Bazley v. Curry, where the 
Supreme Court held the defendant care facility vicariously liable for its employee’s 
sexual assault of children in its care.207 Te employee was certainly not authorized 
to commit intentional torts such as sexual assault. Moreover, the employee’s 
sexual assault impeded, rather than advanced, the actual purposes of enterprise. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of vicarious liability, the scope of employment is 
construed more broadly: If the particular assigned tasks of employment provide 
special opportunity for the particular kind of ensuing tortious harm, the tortious 
act falls within the course of employment so is attributable to the employer.208 
Accordingly, deployers can be vicariously liable for tortious harm caused by 
AAs, even if AAs’ actions are unauthorized and unwanted. At this early point, 
lacking experience with AA deployment, it is difcult to precisely defne the scope 
of deployment. However, I will ofer an initial way to think about this issue. Te 
scope of an AA deployment relation should be defned by an AA’s task: Deployers 
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are vicariously liable where tortious harm caused by an AA falls within the scope 
of the characteristic risk of its deployment. Te scope of AA deployment, then, 
is defned by the deployment risk, analogous to the doctrinal requirement of 
enterprise risk. As discussed, the notion of enterprise risk draws a link between 
an employee’s tortious act and the risk in employing the tortious actor to perform 
an assigned task. Likewise, to ground vicarious liability, an AA’s tortious act 
needs to be sufciently linked to distinct risk in deploying the AA to perform 
its assigned task. Where there is a sufcient nexus between the resulting tortious 
harm and the deployment’s characteristic risk—i.e., the deployment risk—the 
deployment is properly implicated as jointly producing the tortious AA-caused 
harm. For example, in the context of automated vehicles, deployers may be 
vicariously liable for harm caused by AAs’ driving-related errors. Deployers may 
not be vicariously liable, however, for accidents that fall outside the usual scope of 
driving. For instance, if a car is programmed to experiment with energy efciency 
and starts its engine in a garage to recharge its battery causing a passenger’s 
death by carbon monoxide, the resulting harm may fall outside the scope of 
driving-related harms.209 Te point is that vicarious liability for AA-caused harm 
takes this form: Deployers are liable where AAs cause tortious harm falling within 
the scope of risk associated with their ordinary tasks. Te resulting AA-caused 
harm must correspond to a characteristic risk in deploying the particular AA, 
thereby conforming to the doctrinal structure of deployment risk (analogous to 
enterprise risk). 
D. WHO ARE THE DEPLOYERS? 
Te account sketched thus far has not addressed who the deployers are for the 
purposes of vicarious liability. Are they the users (or owners) of AAs or the 
distributors (e.g., manufacturers, designers, retailers) of AAs? 
One argument is that users should be vicariously liable, not distributors. 
Since AAs perform tasks for, and pursue the goals of, their users, they may be 
conceived of as users’ legal agents. By contrast, AAs do not perform specifc tasks 
for manufactures, designers, or retailers. Te employment analogy, then, pertains 
more straightforwardly to AAs’ users than to their distributors. Te connection 
between AAs and their distributors, moreover, refects a design stance. AAs are 
designed, manufactured, and distributed as products. It is only once users deploy 
AAs to perform tasks in social environments that AAs resemble social actors. 
209. See Ryan Calo, “Robots as Legal Metaphors” (2016) 30 Harv JL & Tech 209 at 230. 








Terefore, the argument concludes, AAs’ tortious actions should belong to their 
users, not their distributors. 
But there is also an argument to support imposing vicarious liability on 
AAs’ distributors. AAs may be conceived of as agents of distributors since they 
refect the intentionality that their designers and manufacturers build into 
them. As Deborah Johnson puts it, designers “poise them to behave in certain 
ways,” and they “remain poised to behave in those ways.”210 Conceiving of 
AAs as legal agents of distributors also refects their distinctive middle-ground 
character, falling somewhere between full-fedged persons and mere things.211 
AAs are artifacts; they are designed, produced and distributed as products. 
Products liability is, therefore, a conventional liability category for AA-caused 
harm, implicating distributors, not users. At the same time, AAs’ emergent 
capabilities resist application of conventional products liability, which entails 
burdensome inspection of algorithms for defects, and misapprehends AAs’ social 
and normative position as functionally independent instrumentalities. For these 
reasons, vicarious liability is an attractive solution. Tis framing points to a 
conception of AAs as sophisticated products with intentionality linked to their 
designers and manufacturers. Distributors should then be vicariously liable for 
AAs’ tortious harm, as a sub-species of products liability: Te vicarious liability 
standard refects the fact that these products are emergent and act with functional 
independence. Moreover, regarding AAs as agents of manufacturers, rather than 
users, represents a more incremental development of tort law. As a sub-species of 
products liability, manufacturers’ vicarious liability can be framed as a revamped 
consumer-expectations test: Consumers expect AAs to operate as reasonable 
persons would.212 AAs’ product defectiveness would then be determined with 
respect to their outward behaviour, not their internal design, as per the legal 
intentional stance. 
I conclude this discussion without taking a position on this issue; it sufces 
to fag both approaches as possible tort doctrines. My reluctance to determine 
the identity of the deployer does not undermine this article’s vicarious liability 
210. Johnson, supra note 138 at 201. 
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would. See Smith, supra note 26 at 46. According to the argument in the text, Smith’s 
application of the consumer-expectations test is actually a version of vicarious liability, 
as applied to autonomous machines. 
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analysis. My intent is to present vicarious liability as a suitable form of tort 
liability for AA-caused harm. Te issue of which entities should be deployers for 
the purposes of vicarious liability—whether users or distributors—is a separate 
inquiry. It presupposes, however, an initial foundation that vicarious liability is a 
suitable form of liability for AA-caused harm. Te aim of this article is to explore 
this foundation: Vicarious liability for AA-caused harm involves conceiving 
of AAs as pure legal agents with capacity to efect liability consequences for 
deployers. Within this account, however, either users or distributors could 
be deemed, in law, to be deployers for the purposes of vicarious liability. Te 
choice between users and distributors, crucially, should be informed by more 
robust considerations of policy, a line of inquiry falling outside the scope of 
this article. Te pure legal agency or vicarious liability account, in this sense, 
is underdetermined, so it can and should be supplemented with more concrete 
reasons relating to efcient accident-cost allocation, incentivizing technological 
innovation, securing compensatory access for faultless victims, and interpersonal 
accountability—on economic and ethical grounds. 
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF AAS’ PURE LEGAL AGENCY 
In this study, the point of departure was tort law. Te pure legal agency conception 
of AAs relates specifcally to a theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm, 
based on an analogy between AA deployment and human employment. AAs are 
conceived of as pure legal agents, empowered to trigger their deployers’ vicarious 
liability. Since this classifcation views AAs as legal agents, it also implicates the 
laws of agency more generally. AAs’ pure legal agency category, then, needs to 
be situated within a broader agency framework, compared and contrasted with 
ordinary instances of legal agency constituted by two legal persons. In particular, 
I note two essential features that typically constitute legal agency relations: the 
frst is a mutually manifested assent by principal and agent; the second is a set of 
fduciary duties owed by agents to principals. A theory of AAs’ pure legal agency 
must account for the apparent absence of these features. Tis section sketches 
the relation between pure legal agency and ordinary legal agency constituted by 
two legal persons. Tis account is admittedly partial and incomplete, however; 
it is only a preliminary point of entry toward a theory of pure legal agency. 
Legal agency relations ordinarily arise upon mutually manifested assent by 
a principal and agent; that the agent acts for, and subject to the control of, the 















principal.213 Te requisite manifestations of assent can occur in several ways: 
by contract, whether express or implied, oral or written; ratifcation, where 
the principal assents to an act after-the-fact; estoppel, where a person acts for 
another to an extent that causes others to reasonably believe an agency relation 
exists; or necessity, where a person acts for another in an emergency.214 Samir 
Chopra and Laurence White note that legal agency relations may arise due to 
observable actions of principal and agent, without express agreement of agency.215 
Tis occurs, for instance, in situations of estoppel. AAs’ pure legal agency would 
fall under this rubric; their legal agency status is inferred from their roles and 
behaviours. Te initiation of an AA agency relation certainly diverges from typical 
instances of legal agency wherein legal agents are also legal persons who manifest 
assent in more obvious ways. Nevertheless, as Chopra and White maintain, there 
is a doctrinal basis for inferring AAs’ legal agency from their deployment itself.216 
A second fundamental feature of legal agency is the set of duties that 
agents owe to their principals. Tese include, among others, duties to obey 
principals’ instructions, to act with skill and loyalty, and to protect confdential 
information.217 We must ask: Can AAs have, and fulfl, duties to their deployers? 
Chopra and White argue that “artifcial agents can be coherently understood 
as having duties to their principals if we can understand them as acting in 
conformity with statements that are best understood as their obligations to their 
principals.”218 Tis position refects an intentional stance; AAs’ performances of 
required tasks—for instance, submitting daily reports of earnings to principals— 
is interpreted as compliance with duties.219 
My contention, however, is that the terminology of rights and duties— 
that AAs owe duties to deployers who hold correlative rights—is unftting in 
the context of AAs’ pure legal agency. Since AAs lack legal personhood, they 
probably cannot participate in juridical relations constituted by correlative rights 
and duties. If this is true, one may object to AAs’ classifcation as legal agents; 
after all, fduciary duties are central to legal agency. Nevertheless, my thought is 
that AAs’ legal agency status—that is, their powers to efect legal consequences 
for deployers—is coherent even without owing fduciary duties to deployers. 
213. Restatement (Tird) of Agency § 1.01 (2006). 
214. Chopra & White, supra note 88 at 19, citing Robert W Emerson & John W Hardwicke, 
Business Law, 3rd ed (Barron’s Educational Series, 1997) at 251. 
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Te rough argument is this: Fiduciary duties are required to constitute legal 
agency relations specifcally where legal agents are independent legal persons 
with their own interests. In such cases, agents’ conficts of interest are a real 
concern, so fduciary duties serve to ensure agents act only for the interests of 
their principals. By contrast, since AAs are pure legal agents, without interests of 
their own, fduciary duties are largely redundant. AAs inherently and exclusively 
pursue their deployers’ purposes.220 
As a general matter, fduciary obligations lie at the core of legal agency, 
integral to the exercise of fduciary power. Fiduciary obligations are about 
ensuring the agent’s loyalty: allegiance or dedication to the principal’s cause rather 
than to self-interest.221 Fiduciary relationships arise where a legal actor holds 
discretionary power: the capacity to exercise judgment for a benefciary.222 Lionel 
Smith understands the requirement of loyalty as a required manner of exercising 
judgment, where fduciaries need to subjectively believe that their choices are 
in the best interests of benefciaries.223 While there are several constraints on 
fduciaries’ powers that are assessed objectively—such as duties of care, skill, and 
diligence—the requirement of loyalty has a subjective character.224 
Te fduciary power and its requirement of loyalty are not simply 
contractual.225 Te grant of fduciary power can be voluntary, as in typical 
principal-agent relationships; however, fduciary powers may also exist as a 
matter of law, as in cases of company directors and executors who hold powers in 
managerial capacities.226 Te fduciary requirement of loyalty is imposed by law 
if, and only if, a certain kind of role is assumed: “When one person acquires the 
authority to make decisions on behalf of another person, there is a partial transfer 
of autonomy.”227 In this situation, the fduciary is authorized to act for the other, 
not just in a way that afects the other.228 Smith argues that the requirement 
of loyalty is an inherent feature of the fduciary relation: It is built into the 
power itself.229 In fduciary relations, he reasons, fduciaries are empowered to 
220. See Johnson & Powers, supra note 163 at 255-59; Johnson, supra note 138 at 201-203. 
221. Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf 
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exercise a part of the benefciaries’ autonomy by making decisions that belong 
to benefciaries.230 Te fduciary makes decisions for the benefciary; that is, the 
fduciary exercises the benefciary’s decision-making power.231 Since the fduciary 
power is about exercising the autonomy of another, the requirement of loyalty 
is not an external duty but an aspect of the power itself, the very meaning of 
acting for the benefciary. Te requirement of loyalty, then, is not a duty in the 
strict sense; rather, it is a power-conferring rule, with built-in limits to exercise 
the power loyally.232 For this reason, the primary remedy for breaches of loyalty 
is rescission. Tis is analogous to situations where one enters into compelled 
agreements: A non-loyal exercise of judgment for the benefciary is fundamentally 
fawed and incoherent, and prompts rescission.233 
Te fduciary power and its requirement of loyalty are tied to two further 
rules: the no-conficts rule, and the no-profts rule. Te no-conficts rule is as an 
extension of the loyalty requirement. In situations of confict, it is impossible to 
be certain that extraneous considerations—i.e., those negatively afecting loyal 
judgment—have been excluded.234 Te no-conficts rule relates to the subjective 
character of loyalty; compliance cannot be objectively determined by evaluating 
the fduciary’s decision itself.235 In situations of confict, loyalty cannot be assured, 
so fduciaries’ legal acts are voidable by benefciaries.236 Te no-profts rule, 
fnally, permits benefciaries to strip profts from fduciaries gained through their 
fduciary positions. According to Smith, recovery of profts is a rule of primary 
attribution, not a secondary rule resulting from fduciary wrongdoing; it arises 
from the fduciary relation itself, in which the fduciary receives all profts for the 
benefciary.237 Again, this relates to the transfer of the benefciary’s autonomy 
to the fduciary: Where the fduciary gains something through the fduciary 
position—while acting for the benefciary—the gain is credited to the benefciary 
as a primary right.238 
Accordingly, the essential feature of the fduciary relation is the transfer of 
discretionary decision-making power to the fduciary, along with the fduciary’s 
subjective identifcation with the interests of the benefciary, as represented by the 
230. Ibid. 
231. Ibid. 
232. Ibid at 621. 
233. Ibid at 620. 
234. Ibid at 624. 
235. Ibid. 
236. Ibid at 625. 
237. Ibid at 628. 
238. Ibid. 








HUBERMAN, AUTONOMOUS-MACHINE-CAUSED HARM 283 
requirement of loyalty. Fiduciary duties are intelligible in light of this juridical 
relation: Tey ensure that the fduciary exercises discretionary decision-making 
power for the benefciary, so that the fduciary’s decision can rightly be seen as the 
benefciary’s decision. Terefore, if the agency relation—as a fduciary relation— 
has a core meaning, it is the transfer of discretionary decision-making power 
itself—i.e., the power to act for another—not the fduciary duties which support it. 
Let us return to the pure legal agency account. AAs perform tasks for deployers 
with functional independence. In this sense, AAs’ social role is analogous to that 
of legal agents: AAs are instrumentally rational actors who act exclusively for 
human or corporate purposes. Tey do not have their own subjective interests 
that need to be restrained. Teir legal agency status is then intelligible without 
being constituted by fduciary duties. In ordinary instances of legal agency, where 
agents are legal persons with their own personal interests, fduciary duties are 
necessary to constitute agency relations. In these instances, absent fduciary 
duties, there is no assurance that agents will act exclusively for their principals, 
subjectively identifying with their principals’ interests. However, since AAs do 
not have subjective interests of their own, fduciary duties are redundant. 
Admittedly, this is not a comprehensive treatment of the laws of agency. 
To reiterate, in this article, the point of departure was tort law, and AAs’ pure legal 
agency status relates specifcally to a theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused 
harm, based on an analogy between AA deployment and human employment. 
Te broader implications of AAs’ pure legal agency status fall beyond the scope 
of this article. However, Smith’s conception of legal agency as a transfer of 
discretionary decision-making power—the power to act for another—suggests 
that agency has a core meaning that is applicable to AAs. Tis core insight ofers a 
plausible theoretical foundation to ground vicarious liability for AA-caused harm 
and is a point of entry toward a theory of pure legal agency. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Te doctrinal form of vicarious liability ofers a promising basis to ground 
tort liability for AA-caused harm, upon which deployers are liable for tortious 
harm caused by AAs in the course of deployment. In this view, AAs’ outward 
efects are evaluated as tortious (or non-tortious), pursuant to a legal intentional 
stance, alleviating the inefcient task of scrutinizing AAs’ emergent algorithms to 
trace AAs’ harmful efects to tortious human agency. AAs’ tortious acts are then 
attributed to deployers when committed in the course of deployment—that is, 
when related to characteristic deployment risk. In this way, AAs resemble legal 
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agents, empowered to trigger liability consequences for deployers. In particular, 
AAs are pure legal agents without legal personhood. 
AAs’ pure legal agency is coherent and sensible in the context of vicarious 
liability, which implicates a broader deployment relation, and not AAs’ intrinsic 
legal or moral character. Te pure legal agency classifcation captures AAs’ 
normative position within human relations as functionally independent and 
rational instruments deployed to act exclusively for human purposes. Evaluating 
AAs’ external behaviours as tortious is a surrogate for determining their deployers’ 
agent-specifc (vicarious) liability as a matter of tort law. Te pure legal agency 
classifcation, in this respect, ofers a valuable strategy to promote pragmatic 
liability outcomes for AA-caused harm, in accordance with tort’s doctrinal and 
theoretical structure of corrective justice. 


